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INSIDE THE ARBITRATOR’S MIND
Susan D. Franck
Anne van Aaken
James Freda
Chris Guthrie
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*
Arbitrators are lead actors in global dispute resolution. They are to global
dispute resolution what judges are to domestic dispute resolution. Despite this,
arbitral decisionmaking is a black box. This Article is the first to use original
experimental research to explore how international arbitrators decide cases. We
find that arbitrators often make intuitive and impressionistic decisions rather
than fully deliberative ones. We also find evidence that casts doubt on the
conventional wisdom that arbitrators render “split the baby” decisions.
Although direct comparisons are difficult, we find that arbitrators generally
perform at least as well as, but never demonstrably worse than, national judges
analyzed in earlier research. There may be reasons to prefer judges to
international arbitrators, but the quality of judgment and decisionmaking, at
least as measured in these experimental studies, is not one of them. Thus,
normative debates about global dispute resolution should focus not on
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decisionmaker identity or title but rather on structural safeguards and legal
protections to enhance quality rule of law based decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is an important alternative to litigation in the United States,
particularly in consumer, employment, and securities disputes.1 But arbitration’s
role in domestic dispute resolution pales in comparison to the role it plays
globally. In most international disputes, arbitration is the default dispute
resolution method.2
This means that arbitrators are the central actors in international dispute
resolution. They play a vital role in the global economy, oversee disputes
involving billions of dollars, and make decisions implicating the transnational
rule of law.
Despite the outsized role that arbitrators play in international dispute
resolution, we know relatively little about how they make decisions. Some
commentators sing arbitrators’ praises,3 observing that they possess both
subject-matter expertise and incentives to resolve disputes according to
governing law. Other commentators decry their skill and demand instead that
judges resolve disputes.4 They question the quality of arbitrator
1

See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
George A. Bermann, International Commercial Arbitration: Past, Present, Future, 33 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. (Int’l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Resolution), May 2015, at 65, 65; see also Gilles
Cuniberti, Beyond Contract—The Case for Default Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 417, 417–18 (2009); Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International
Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 233 (2006) (“Between 1993 and 2003, the number of
international arbitration proceedings administered by leading institutions almost doubled.”); Stephen R. Halpin
III, Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina and the Vitality of Host-Country Litigation
Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1979, 2021–22 (2014) (“[I]nternational
arbitration between foreign investors and host countries will remain the dominant method of conclusively
resolving investment disputes . . . .”).
3 See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Elements of Procedure: Are They Separately Portable?, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 649, 654 (1997); see also Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 958–59 (2005); Jason Webb Yackee, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An
Emerging Defense for Host States, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 723, 744 n.105 (2012).
4 Letter from Alliance for Justice to U.S. Congressional Officials and U.S. Trade Representative (Mar.
11, 2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf; see also supra note 76 and
accompanying text (identifying that German judges publicly rejected arbitration of international investment
disputes and demanded disputes be returned to national courts). Other critiques of international arbitration
address transparency, review by national courts, consistency in outcome, and diversity of adjudicators. Susan D.
Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International Arbitration, 53
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429 (2015); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
2
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decisionmaking,5 arguing that arbitrators often ignore applicable law6 and
generally “split the baby” by making awards that fall halfway between the
positions the parties advance.7 Whatever perspective they espouse,
commentators debate the relative merits of international arbitration in an
information vacuum.
In an effort to shed some light on arbitration, this Article reports the results
of a first-ever set of experiments involving international arbitrator
decisionmaking.8 In it, we describe how international arbitrators decide
hypothetical cases. When possible, we compare arbitrators’ performance to
domestic judges. We also explore how the experimental insights we glean might
inform adjudicative design.
To do so, we draw on decades of experimental research on the psychology
of judgment and decisionmaking. That research shows—contrary to the
assumptions of classical economics but consistent with common sense—that

Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005). These
concerns are beyond this Article, as they do not address decision-making psychology.
5 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges,
Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 361 (2014); see also Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as
Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2010)
(“[A]rbitrators might deliver poor-quality decisions that undermine the attractiveness of arbitration as a whole.”);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 458 (1988) (“[T]he less favorable a
person’s view of the quality of decisionmakers in arbitration, the more likely that person was to support broader
judicial review of arbitration awards.”).
6 See David S. Baffa, John L. Collins & Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Guidance for Employers Considering
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements with Class and Collective Action Waivers, 39 EMP. REL. L.J. 34, 41 (2013);
see also Henry Wade Rogers, The Essentials of a Law Establishing an International Court, 22 YALE L.J. 277,
287 (1913) (“[O]ne who carefully examines the decisions rendered by the Arbitral Tribunals will come to the
conclusion that they are inferior to those rendered in the Supreme Court of the United States.”); Peter B.
Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151, 175 (2004) (observing
that immunity “allows arbitrators to render poor or unenforceable decisions and then . . . escape responsibility”).
7 William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629,
689–93 (2009); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 93 (2013); see also WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 560 (2d ed. 2012) (describing bankers’ herd mentality and
suggesting arbitration in an unnecessary invitation to render split the difference awards); Richard A. Posner,
Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FL. ST. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2005) (“We can
expect, therefore, a tendency for arbitrators to ‘split the difference’ in their awards . . . .”); Joshua B. Simmons,
Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 200, 208–
14 (2012) (identifying “perceptions that arbitrators merely ‘split the baby’ between the parties’ proposed
valuations, particularly when awards are poorly explained”).
8 But see infra note 83 and accompanying text (describing how, until recently, most exploration about
cognitive illusions in international arbitration was largely theoretical).
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human beings often make decisions in irrational, but predictable, ways.9
Likewise, we draw on more recent research showing that judges, like other
human beings, are also prone to predictably irrational decisionmaking.10 But
what about arbitrators?
We might hypothesize that arbitrators make decisions much like judges.
Arbitrators, like judges, are human beings; both arbitrators and judges are elite
professionals engaged in the task of applying legal principals to facts and have
a legal mandate to exercise their judgment in a neutral and objective way. On
the other hand, we might hypothesize that arbitrators and judges make decisions
differently, as each have different incentives, mandates from different
principals,11 different cultures and legal traditions,12 and different subject matter
9 See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (rev. & expanded 2008); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); SCOTT PLOUS,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993).
10 Initial research on cognition and judicial decisionmaking used the term “cognitive illusions” to describe
intuitive, simple, quick assessments. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 782 (2001); see also infra note 77. Psychologists and behavioral
economists call these “biases and heuristics.” In international arbitration, “bias” has a loaded, often undefined,
meaning, whereas “independence” and “impartiality” have precise legal meanings. See MARGARET L. MOSES,
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 135–36 (2d ed. 2012);
Dominque Hascher, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 Issues, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 789, 791–
92 (2012); infra note 70 and accompanying text. We use “cognitive illusion” to avoid confusion and to focus on
intuitive cognition.
11 States sometimes appoint judges to long-term appointments with a broad mandate; other times, national
judges are elected or have finite jurisdiction. See, e.g., APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). By contrast,
parties appoint arbitrators, although courts or institutions can also appoint arbitrators. GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 629 (2d ed. 2001); infra notes
69–70. States pay judges; but parties pay arbitrators, and tribunals allocate costs. Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing
Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769 (2011); see also Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet
& Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 722 (2013) (arguing judges have a
fiduciary duty to the legislature and public in some cases but “arbitrators do not hold the judicial office in a
democracy and therefore do not have a responsibility to the people in the way judges do”). Arbitrators may have
financial interests in re-appointment given prospects of further income, but arbitrators have other incentives like
reputation or lost opportunity of pursuing work that is more fiscally lucrative or less likely to create conflicts of
interest. See Robert O. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 309 (2002) (“[I]t is important not to equate rationality with materialistic self-interest . . . .”).
12 See KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS, at xix–
xx (2014) (observing domestic adjudicators may have different approaches than international courts and
tribunals); Posner, supra note 7, at 1259 (“[J]udicial behavior is likely to differ across national legal systems and
indeed within a nation’s legal systems . . . .”); Leon E. Trakman, “Legal Traditions” and International
Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 2–3 (2006) (discussing different cultures within
international arbitration); Vitalius Tumonis, Adjudication Fallacies: The Role of International Courts in
Interstate Dispute Settlement, 31 WISC. INT’L L.J. 35, 36 (2013) (noting the “fallacy” that “international courts
are essentially analogous to their domestic counterparts, when in fact there are many more differences between
them than similarities”).
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expertise. Judges, as generalists, may be relatively unfamiliar with the facts, law,
and context of a case in front of them; arbitrators, by contrast, often have highly
relevant domain expertise.13
Understanding how arbitrators decide is important because it can inform
hotly contested debates over the proper forms of dispute resolution to deploy
both international and national disputes. Senator Elizabeth Warren has taken
issue with the use of arbitration and objected to the lack of “independent
judges”14 in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.15 Likewise, the European Parliament
expressed a desire to strip arbitrators of jurisdiction in trade agreements16 with
the United States, namely the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), and with Canada, namely, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA);17 instead, the EU demands that judges must resolve
13 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 113
PENN ST. L. REV 1031, 1046 (2009); see also BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1210
(2014) (“International arbitrators are likely more familiar than are judges with the expectations of foreign
investors and recipient nations . . . .”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633–34 (1985) (noting the specialist, elite international arbitrators appointed in that case).
14 TPP Opponents, Warren, Academics Highlight ISDS As Key Reason to Resist Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/tpp-opponents-warren-academics-highlight-isds-keyreason-resist-deal; Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH.
POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-thetrans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html.
15 At the time of writing this article, TPP was signed and was moving forward towards enactment into law
but its future was somewhat uncertain. Compare Tim Worstall, With Trump’s Election the TPP Probably Is
Dead, Yes—As Is the TTIP, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2016, 4:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/
2016/11/11/with-trumps-election-the-tpp-probably-is-dead-yes-as-is-the-ttip/#5104e7185b80 (postulating after
President Trump’s election that the TPP would not survive), and Mike DeBonis, Ed O’Keefe & Ana Swanson,
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Dead, Schumer Tells Labor Leaders, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/10/the-trans-pacific-partnership-is-deadschumer-tells-labor-leaders/?utm_term=.9fc6c62d1d98 (discussing senators’ beliefs that the TPP will not pass
in Congress), with Cyrus Sanati, Trans-Pacific Partnership May Not Be Dead Yet, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2016,
8:07 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2016/11/20/trans-pacific-partnership-may-not-deadyet/93986892/ (discussing the benefits of the TPP and expressing belief that it may survive). During the midst
of editing, an Executive Order withdrew the United States from the TPP. Trump Signs EO Removing US from
TPP, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4651802/trump-eo-tpp&start=24.
16 See EU Finalizes Proposal for Investment Protection and Court System for TTIP, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(Nov. 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1396; see also EU TTIP Team
(@EU_TTIP_Team), TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2015, 4:30 AM), https://twitter.com/EU_TTIP_team/status/
644110990242639873.
17 The original, signed version of CETA included arbitration; but in an unprecedented “scrubbing” process,
arbitration was replaced wholesale with a standing court. Wolfgang Alschner, Legal Scrubbing or
Renegotiation? A Text-as-Data Analysis of How the EU Smuggled an Investment Court into Its Trade Agreement
with Canada, MAPPING BITS BLOG (Mar. 24, 2016), http://mappinginvestmenttreaties.com/blog/2016/03/
legal%20scrubbing-ceta/. While drafting this Article, there were ongoing concerns as to whether CETA will
have any force and effect. Kathleen Harris, Justin Trudeau Says CETA Will Test European Union’s ‘Usefulness’,
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disputes.18 There are similar concerns about arbitrators’ suitability to decide
wholly domestic disputes.19
This Article—in which we peer inside the arbitral mind—aspires to offer an
objective, empirical, and evidence-based approach to these important normative
choices about transnational dispute system design. Ultimate design choices are
part of a larger puzzle that will inevitably be affected by multiple variables,20
including practical politics, political economy, and norm preferences.21 But by
focusing on arbitrator cognition and competence, we hope to contribute to these
design choices.
In Part I of the Article, we introduce international arbitration and behavioral
psychology. In Part II, we identify our hypotheses and experimental
CBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016, 2:55 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/manuel-valls-parliament-hill-trudeau1.3802584. Likewise, with the Brexit vote, TTIP negotiations are stalled. Jim Zarroli, German Official Says
U.S.-Europe Trade Talks Have Collapsed, Blames Washington, NPR (Aug. 26, 2016, 4:31 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/28/491721332/german-official-says-u-s-europe-trade-talkshave-collapsed-blames-washington.
18 Recently, the EU appears to have moved towards creating a multilateral, rather than a series of bilateral,
investment courts. See, e.g., Inception Impact Assessment, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_trade_024_court_on_investment_en.pdf (outlining
the process for moving forward with a multilateral investment court); EUROPEAN COMM’N, CONSULTATION
STRATEGY, IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT FOR
INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/october/tradoc_
154997.09.30%20Consultation%20strategy%20IIA_for%20publication.pdf (outlining the process for moving
forward with a multilateral investment court).
19 See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice
System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-aprivatization-of-the-justice-system.html?ref=topics; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=1; The Editorial Board,
Arbitrating Disputes, Denying Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/
opinion/sunday/arbitrating-disputes-denying-justice.html?ref=topics.
20 See generally Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009); Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161 (2007). While aspects of this Article compare arbitration and litigation, other
processes—including negotiation and mediation—are core options in system design and promote norms like
distributive and procedural justice. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System
Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and
Transitional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289 (2009).
21 Other factors, beyond those in our experiment, invariably influence system design. These might include
concerns related to certainty, predictability, transparency, conflicts of interest, impartiality, legal correctness,
efficiency, enforceability, and diversity. See supra note 4 and note 11 (identifying arbitration-related concerns);
see also infra note 70 and note 244 (identifying arbitration-related concerns). We do not address conflicts of
interest or impartiality in real disputes, as those subjects are better analyzed through arbitration doctrine or
content analysis of existing cases.
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methodology. In Part III, we report experimental results showing that arbitrators,
like judges, are prone to intuitive decisionmaking and the influence of wellknown cognitive illusions like anchoring, framing, representativeness, and
egocentrism. In Part IV, we interpret the results, acknowledge the limitations of
our study, and offer normative assessments. Recognizing that intuition
influences adjudicative determinations irrespective of an adjudicator’s title or
mandate, we argue that dispute system designers should not focus on whether
judges or arbitrators should decide disputes. Rather, system designers should
focus on structural and procedural reforms to decrease the risk of error and to
promote quality decisionmaking in international economic dispute settlement.
I. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
Arbitration is a ubiquitous method of dispute settlement used in both
domestic22 and international disputes.23 This section explores the prevalence and
vitality of international arbitration. It introduces international commercial
arbitration (ICA) and international treaty arbitration (ITA), explains arbitral
procedures, and discusses arbitral decisionmaking.
A. A Doctrinal Primer
Parties involved in global economic activity require reliable dispute
resolution. Although parties can use informal processes—like negotiation or
mediation—these methods operate in the “shadow of the law.”24 International
22 U.S. domestic arbitration involves consumer, employment, franchise, and securities law disputes.
Stephen J. Ware, Teaching Arbitration Law, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 231, 239 (2003); see also CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY, § 5, 30 (2015); Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer
Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 272–75; Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R.
Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 74–75 (2008); Jill I. Gross, The End of
Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1176–77 (2010); Constantine Katsoris, Securities
Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 50 (2008); Erin O’Hara O’Connor,
Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133 (2012).
Employment arbitration is distinguishable from labor arbitration with a distinct doctrinal regime. Arthur T.
Carter, Edward F. Berbarie & Sean M. McCrory, The Principal Differences Between Labor and Employment
Arbitration, 69 THE ADVOCATE 85 (2014); William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration
Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609 (2006).
23 Internationally, arbitration offers a proxy for diplomatic negotiation or state-to-state dispute settlement.
Susan D. Franck, Foreword: A Symposium Exploring the Modern Legacy of William Jennings Bryan, 86 NEB.
L. REV. 142, 144–45 (2007); Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2014).
24 Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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arbitration offers formal adjudication to provide a final and binding assessment
of legal rights and “has achieved a level of legitimacy to which other [types of
international] disciplines can only aspire.”25
There are multiple reasons international arbitration enjoys this stature,
including historic pedigree,26 adaptability to new contexts and the flexibility of
the process,27 the capacity to provide neutrality while avoiding fears that locals
will be favored over foreigners,28 expertise, and a strong enforcement record.29
Moreover, in low-capacity environments where court systems may be weak,
international arbitration fills a crucial developmental gap.30
Two core areas of modern international arbitration are ICA and ITA.31 ICA
is a traditional form of arbitration where parties resolve transnational disputes
under national law.32 ICA covers a broad range of disputes, including contract
breach, business torts, and antitrust violations.33 It typically involves
commercial disputes between two businesses, but it can also encompass contract
disputes between investors and states under national law related to commercial

25 S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory
Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 572–73 (2013).
26 Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L.
REV. 240, 242–43 (1928); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 132, 132 (1934); see also infra notes 40–42.
27 See infra notes 31, 62–70 (describing international arbitration’s substantive and procedural flexibility).
28 See George A. Bermann et al., Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 113
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1333, 1342 (2009) (“Parties choose international arbitration primarily because they fear being
subject to the potentially biased decisions of the national courts of their business-partner-turned-adversary.”);
Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Settlement in
International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 319, 320 (2008)
(“[G]rowth of arbitration has been driven by flaws in the national legal systems and the distrust and suspicion
associated with litigation in a foreign country . . . .”).
29 HERBERT KRONKE, INTRODUCTION TO RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1, 3 (Herbert Kronke et al. eds., 2010);
see also infra note 73 (describing enforcement).
30 Mistelis & Baltag, supra note 28, at 320–21.
31 Ban-Ki Moon, UN Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon’s Address to ICCA 2016 Congress, May 9, 2016,
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-05-09/secretary-generals-address-international-councilcommercial («l’arbitrage peut jouer un rôle clef pour ce qui est de restaurer l’état de droit après un conflit,
puisqu’établir un système judiciaire pleinement indépendant peut prendre du temps»). Arbitration extends to
other areas. See, e.g., supra note 22.
32 Depending upon the applicable law, ICA may require application of transnational, including the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) UNIDROIT, law principles. George Bermann, Restating
the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 175, 190–91 (2009).
33 See, e.g., JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 187–219 (2003); JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 265–73 (2007).
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ventures or infrastructure projects.34 Arbitrators use existing commercial law—
whether codified in national statutes, case law, or otherwise—to adjudicate
claims and finally resolve disputes.35
ICA is common and growing.36 International arbitration centers report that
hundreds of cases are filed annually.37 Commentators identified over 2700
disputes involved in institutional arbitration in one year and “major claims”
involving billions of dollars.38 In its 2015 analysis, the American Lawyer
identified over 125 cases with billion-dollar claims.39
ITA, or arbitration devolving from international law-based treaty rights
states grant to investors, also has deep roots. It arose from international law
mixed-claims commissions where states created sui generis opportunities for
private individuals or entities to bring claims against states for economic harm.
34 HEGE ELISABETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 158, 163 (Vaughan Lowe,
Dan Sarooshi & Stefan Talmon eds., 2013); Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, HostState “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361, 382–83
(2013).
35 W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Application of Law in International Commercial
Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 260 (2010); see Susan D. Franck, The Role of International
Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 504 (2006). It is possible to apply more nebulous conceptions of
fairness, namely principles of amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono; but this is uncommon and requires
parties to opt-in to the discretion. Id.; Leon Trakman, Ex Aequo Et Bono: Demystifying an Ancient Concept, 8
CHI. J. INT’L L. 621, 623, 632 n.64 (2008).
36 TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 341 app. 1
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); Bermann, supra note 2, at 73.
37 See Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract—The Case for Default Arbitration in International Commercial
Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 417, 418 (2009) (“Some of the major international arbitral institutions report
that their caseload has increased dramatically.”); The AAA/ICDR and Fidal’s “Dispute-Wise” Business
Management France Survey Results Released, 4 ICDR INT’L ARB. REP. 3, 3 (2013) (identifying administration
of 996 cases during 2012); International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Reveals Record Number of New
Arbitration Cases Filed in 2016, https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-reveals-record-number-newarbitration-cases-filed-2016/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) (identifying 966 arbitration requests filed at the ICC in
2016); LCIA, REGISTRAR’S REPORT 1 (2013), http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx (identifying 290
arbitrations filed in 2013); SCC Statistics 2014, ARBITRATION INST. STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/93526/statistics-2014.pdf (identifying 117 new arbitrations in 2013).
38 See Mark Bezant, James Nicholson & Howard Rosen, Trends in International Arbitration: A New World
Order, FTI JOURNAL 3–4 (Feb. 2015), http://www.ftijournal.com/uploads/images/GAR_020415.pdf (reporting
that in 2012, there were over 2700 international arbitration cases filed in various institutions and, in 2013, the
value of pending “major claims” was over US$1.6 billion); Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Analysis
of UNCITRAL Questionnaires on Interim Relief, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 129, 129 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005)
(observing that, in 2000, the AAA administered over 500 disputes, and over the years, the ICC has administered
cases “with claims in the billions of dollars”).
39 Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 2015, AM. LAWYER: FOCUS EUROPE (2015). Goldhaber’s
article does not indicate, however, whether the cases he analyzed were filed, pending, or just randomly sampled
during the time of analysis (2013–2014).
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Early arbitrations addressed disputes under the 1794 Jay Treaty,40 involving
claims about wartime debts owed to British merchants and which owes its origin
to the advocacy of Alexander Hamilton,41 and the Alabama Claims Commission,
where arbitrators adjudicated disputes involving destroyed U.S. commercial
vessels.42
ITA is the method of dispute resolution embedded in more than 3000
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. These treaties grant foreign
investors substantive rights and provide ex ante consent to arbitration.43 Parties
resolve disputes arising under the treaties, including claims of improper
discrimination, failure to provide proper compensation for expropriation, and
breaches of promises to provide “fair and equitable” treatment.44 Only
qualifying investors can sue, and they can only sue for state conduct breaching
a treaty causing compensable damage.45 ITA disputes receiving public attention
include: investors suing Argentina for damages after Argentina devalued the
peso and other emergency measures to stabilize its economy;46 the Chevron–
Ecuador dispute over activities in the Amazonian rain forest47 where the U.S.
Supreme Court recently left in place a D.C. Circuit opinion confirming a US$96
40 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; Richard B.
Lillich, The Jay Treaty Commissions, 37 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 260, 261–62 (1963).
41 See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 485–503 (2004) (discussing historical aspects of Jay
Treaty); TODD ESTES, THE JAY TREATY DEBATE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE EVOLUTION OF EARLY AMERICAN
POLITICAL CULTURE 82–83 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2006) (describing initial reluctance by
Hamilton and but noting his vigorous defense and support of the treaty).
42 Charles H. Brower, II, The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Under Private
and Public International Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 259, 272–74 (2008); Barton Legum, The Innovation
of Investor-State Arbitration under NAFTA, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 531, 536 (2002).
43 Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable Development,
17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 523–24 (2013).
44 Some rights are analogous to a constitutional “bill of rights” for investors. Susan D. Franck, The Nature
and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 48 (2005); David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New
Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767 (2000). States can limit court access with sovereign
immunity, fail to permit domestic review of government conduct, or have strong rule of law. Stephen E. Blythe,
The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 47 INT’L LAW. 273, 274–75, 281–82 (2013).
45 Susan D. Franck & Lindsey Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J.
459, 473–74 (2015).
46 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT 248 (2011).
47 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1274.pdf; Jesse Greenspan, 2nd
Circ. Greenlights Chevron, Ecuador Arbitration, LAW360 (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/232959/2nd-circ-greenlights-chevron-ecuador-arbitration (explaining that the dispute is about “pollution
in the Amazon rain forest”).
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million award;48 and Phillip Morris suing Australia and Uruguay (and losing
both cases) for plain-packaging cigarette regulations that arguably resulted in
expropriation of intellectual property.49 Other ITA disputes are less sensational
and more business-oriented, including suits involving revocation of a banking
license or failure to pay dividends.50 ITA requires using applicable law, which
is usually derived from the treaty, to make decisions.
Since the first award in 1990,51 ITA has expanded. While the global ITA
caseload is smaller than ICA,52 the value at stake is nonetheless noteworthy. The
average ITA claim exceeds US$650 million, the average combined legal fees
are roughly US$10 million, and arbitrators and institutional expenses cost
roughly US$1 million per case.53 Experts have estimated that ITA will cover
roughly 40%–60% of global investment.54

48 Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 2410 (2016);
Caroline Simson, A Cheat Sheet to Chevron’s Epic Feud with Ecuador, LAW360 (June 14, 2016),
https:/www.law360.com/articles/805987/a-cheat-sheet-to-chevron-s-epic-feud-with-ecuador.
49 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711; Philip Morris Brand Sàrl v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7417.pdf.
50 See Ross P. Buckley & Paul Blyschak, Guarding the Open Door: Non-party Participation Before the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 353, 366 (2007);
Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L.
711, 748 (2007).
51 Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27,
1990), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-%20documents/ita1034.pdf.
52 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimates there have been roughly 500 ITA
disputes. Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration
Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 15 (2014); see also Bezant, Nicholson & Rosen, supra note 38, at 3 (estimating
roughly 40–50 ICSID cases are filed every year).
53 Franck & Wylie, supra note 45.
54 Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives (last visited Feb. 1, 2017); Jana Kasperkevic, You Down with
TPP? An Explainer on Obama’s ‘Secret’ Trade Pact, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2015, 10:10 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/12/trans-pacific-partnership-explainer; Rem Korteweg, It’s the
Geopolitics, Stupid: Why TTIP Matters, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN REFORM (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.cer.org.uk/
insights/it%E2%80%99s-geopolitics-stupid-why-ttip-matters. Should TPP not go into effect, the estimate would
require reconsideration. In any event, the U.S. withdrawal from TPP may require recalculation. See supra note
15 (indicating that the future and scope of TPP is uncertain).
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Beyond sheer caseload and fiscal risks, international arbitration regulates
global economic activity55 and contributes to transnational lawmaking.56 In ICA,
tribunals render a final, binding, and enforceable decision for disputes arising
under national law. These decisions create law for courts supervising arbitration
or evaluating award enforceability. In ITA, tribunals evaluate treaty obligations
to ascertain whether state conduct violates an investor’s treaty-protected rights.
This requires assessment of state liability for international law wrongs and can
involve public policy considerations.57 Although neither ICA nor ITA
necessarily creates de jure precedent,58 arbitration awards have a de facto
effect59 and have the capacity to influence doctrinal development.60 ICA and
ITA lack a unified traditional court structure, but the arbitral mandate requires
arbitrators to apply law to facts and to render binding decisions that can be
reviewed by national courts.61

55 See Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions,
Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (2007); W. Michael Reisman, International
Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 185, 186,
189 (2009); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State
Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 138–39 (2007).
56 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2009); Stephan W. Schill, International Arbitrators as System-Builders, 106 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 295, 295 (2012).
57 Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach,
54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 370–78 (2014).
58 Franck, supra note 4, at 1611–12; see also Rogers, supra note 3, at 999–1000 (“[I]n the absence of a
formal system of stare decisis, and despite the confidential and ‘private’ nature of international arbitration,
arbitration proceedings generate procedural rules and practices, and to a lesser extent substantive rules, that serve
as precedent for future arbitrations and beyond.”); Id. at 999 n.145 (“[P]ublished awards fail to ‘command stare
decisis respect’ like a court decision[.]”).
59 Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 391,
413 (2012); Strong, supra note 25, at 504.
60 W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895,
1929 (2010).
61 International arbitration falls squarely within the ambit of international courts and tribunals. Gary B.
Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 780–81 (2012); Andrea K. Bjorklund,
Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals
Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 245 (2007); Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does the
Proliferation of International Dispute Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law?, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 219 (2002). In ICA, the New York Convention permits limited review of arbitration awards by national
courts. In ITA, disputes rendered pursuant to the New York Convention are similarly reviewable by national
courts, whereas disputes rendered under the ICSID Convention benefit from internal annulment proceedings but
are only subject to review by national courts as if the award was a national court judgment. Franck, Legitimacy
Crisis, supra note 4, at 1546–55.
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B. Arbitration Procedures
International arbitration is a creature of consent. Parties—whether
individuals, commercial entities, or governments—must agree to arbitrate
conflicts involving commercial disputes or other transnational relationships.62 In
ICA, parties typically agree to arbitrate in contracts ex ante,63 and in ITA, two
or more states make an ex ante offer in a treaty that their respective investors’
can arbitrate, which investors later accept by initiating arbitration.64 Under both
ICA and ITA, parties agree arbitrators will be neutral adjudicators finally
resolving disputes using applicable law. Arbitration allows parties to create
tailor-made procedural rules, but practically speaking, particularly with its
“judicialization”65 or “Americanization,”66 international arbitration procedures
resemble more rigid and rule-oriented national court litigation.67 International
arbitration frequently involves submission of formal pleadings (e.g., a Request
for Arbitration and Answer), requests to dismiss cases early on jurisdictional
grounds, petitions for interim relief, requests for documents; competing expert
reports, hearings for the evidence presentation and oral testimony, witness crossexamination, post-hearing submissions, and formal awards.68

62

186.

See, e.g., BORN, supra note 11, at 187, 197, 217; LEW, MISTELIS & KROLL, supra note 33, at 4–5, 99–

63 See Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration
Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 (1995).
64 See Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313,
314 (2014); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 232, 233 (1995).
65 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND
UNIFORMITY?, at ix (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994); Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full
Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes,
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1342 n.22 (2007).
66 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 69, 69 (2003); Bernard Audit, L’Américanisation du droit [The Americanization of Law], 45 ARCHIVES
DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 7 (2001); Eric Bergsten, The Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 289 (2006); Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile, 2005
J. DISP. RESOL. 323, 326–27; Susan L. Karamanian, Overstating the “Americanization” of International
Arbitration: Lessons from ICSID, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 5, 5–7 (2003); George M. von Mehren & Alana
C. Jochum, Is International Arbitration Becoming Too American?, 2 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 47, 47–57 (2011).
67 BORN, supra note 11, at 1–2; see also William W. Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, 1 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 25, 26–27 (2010) (“In examining the competing views of reality proposed by each side, arbitrators
aim to get as near as reasonably possible to a correct picture of those disputed events, words, and legal norms
that bear consequences for the litigants’ claims and defences.”).
68 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 11, at 1–2; Franck, supra note 20, at 192–94.
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While parties control (either directly or indirectly) arbitrator appointment,69
arbitrators must abide by rules that require impartial and independent
decisionmaking.70 The applicable law imposes duties upon arbitrators,71 like
minimizing expense and delay in decisionmaking.72 After arbitrators render an
award, treaties facilitate streamlined enforcement of awards.73
C. Arbitration Decisionmaking
Given their mandate and discretion on issues of economic and doctrinal
importance, international arbitrators play a vital role in global disputes. The
integrity and quality of their decisionmaking is therefore central to arbitration’s
legitimacy as a form of dispute settlement.74 Uncertainty about the quality of
decisions has created apprehension and debate75 about whether international
arbitrators should be stripped of jurisdiction in favor of judges.76
69 There are various appointment methods. Depending on parties’ agreement and applicable law, parties,
co-arbitrators, arbitral institutions, or another neutral body may appoint arbitrators; national courts can also make
appointments. See, e.g., Born, supra note 11, at 614–52.
70 See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 431, 438–54 (2013); Franck, supra note 35, at 502–12; see also Craig, supra note 35, at 253 (“It is
widely recognized in the practice of international commercial arbitration and in the rules of international
arbitration institutions that a party-appointed arbitrator must be impartial and independent.” (footnote omitted)).
71 LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 33, at 279–83; Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect
the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005); Susan D. Franck,
The Liability of International Arbitrators, 20 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4–11, 37, 44 (2000).
72 England and Wales impose an obligation to “adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the
particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution” of
disputes. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 33(1) (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents.
73 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S 38; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30,
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 53, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S 159.
74 Stephan W. Schill, International Arbitrators as System-Builders, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 295,
296–97 (2012).
75 Patrick Sweeney, Exceeding Their Powers: A Critique of Stolt-Nielsen and Manifest Disregard, and a
Proposal for Substantive Arbitral Award Review, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2014).
76 See Editorial, The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investorsarbitration; Henry Farrell, People Are Freaking Out About the Trans Pacific Partnership’s Investor Dispute
Settlement System. Why Should You Care?, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/26/people-are-freaking-out-about-the-trans-pacific-partnerships-investordispute-settlement-system-why-should-you-care/; Jonathan Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership Seen as Door
for Foreign Suits Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/business/
trans-pacific-partnership-seen-as-door-for-foreign-suits-against-us.html?_r=2; supra notes 14–17; see also
Juergen Mark, German Association of Judges on the TTIP Proposal of the European Commission, GLOBAL ARB.
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/german-association-judges-proposal-europeancommission-introduction-investment-court-system-settle-investor-state-disputes-transatlantic-trade-investmen/
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Researchers have studied judges and found that they do not decide cases in
a purely rational manner. Instead, judges often make initial intuitive judgments
which they might, or might not, override with deliberation.77 They are
influenced, for example, by irrelevant numerical anchors,78 the way outcomes
are framed,79 and irrelevant emotional cues.80
In stark contrast to this research on judges, we know little about arbitrators.
Some researchers have conducted qualitative arbitrator interviews81 or examined

(describing how German judges reject any form of transnational dispute settlement involving suits against states
and instead assert national court judges should have jurisdiction); TTIP Trade Talks: German Judges Oppose
New Investor Courts, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35503885 (same).
77 See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking];
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination
of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden
Judiciary]; Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10; Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1251 (2005) [hereinafter Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Disregarding]. The theories of either a
pure formalist or pure realist model of decisionmaking are unsupported by the data; rather the data supports a
model of judging called the “intuitive override” model, whereby adjudication involves initial intuitive
assessments that can be tested against evidence and logic. See, e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking,
supra; Linda A. Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1, 1718
(2013).
78 See infra notes 14351; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges
Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695 (2015)
[hereinafter Rachlinski, Wistrich & Guthrie, Distorted Damages].
79 See infra notes 18792 (discussing framing).
80 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1586 (2013) (identifying how directing judicial attention shapes outcomes); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1189 (2013) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, Contrition] (finding apologies can
induce judges to be more lenient but identifying the limitations of apologies); Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 855, 862 (2015) [hereinafter Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, Heart] (finding that “judges’ feelings about
litigants influence their judgments”).
81 See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996); Thomas Schultz & Robert
Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years After Dezalay & Garth, 28 ARB. INT’L
161 (2012); see also JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTRACT LAW 10 (2013) (drawing upon interviews with international arbitrators “selected to represent as wide
as possible a range of backgrounds” to conclude arbitrators and judges decide cases differently); Sophie Nappert
& Dieter Flader, Psychological Factors in the Arbitral Process, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 134 (Doak Bishop & Edward G. Kehoe eds., 2d ed. 2010) (exploring “what persuades and triggers
decision-making in international arbitrators” by circulating questionnaires on listservs, receiving nineteen
responses, and failing to identify a response rate).
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arbitration outcomes.82 We are unaware of any scholarship experimentally
testing international arbitrator decisionmaking.83 Until now.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
In this Part, we introduce our study of arbitrator decisionmaking, including
our research hypotheses, the demographic characteristics of our participants, and
our experimental methodology.
A. Research Hypotheses
It is an open question whether international arbitrators, like other experts, are
influenced by cognitive illusions. Given the existing experimental literature on
national court and administrative law judges (ALJs), one reasonable theory is
that, like other adjudicators, cognitive illusions affect international arbitrators.
An alternative theory is that cognitive illusions affect international arbitrators
differently, presumably making them inferior adjudicators and thereby less
worthy of resolving complex international disputes.

82 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Behavioral Analysis of Arbitral Decision Making, in TOWARDS A
SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 319 (Christopher R. Drahozal &
Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) (exploring ICA empirical literature); Susan D. Franck, Development and
Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 438 (2009) (exploring whether the context,
political or otherwise, of arbitration explains ITA outcomes); Franck & Wylie, supra note 45 (exploring
arbitrator-based and case-based models of ITA outcomes); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor:
Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2010) (exploring
appointment patterns on arbitration outcomes); see also Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration
Marketplace, 25 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 387 (2014) (exploring the web of the arbitrator marketplace in ITA).
83 In 2004, Drahozal observed, “[e]mpirical studies of the prevalence of cognitive illusions in arbitral
decisionmaking are exceedingly rare. I am aware of no such studies using experimental techniques.” Christopher
R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 114 (2004). This
remains true in international arbitration. Scholars, like Drahozal, have largely explored the theoretical
application of cognitive illusions to international dispute settlement. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond,
Psychological Aspects of Dispute Resolution: Issues for International Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 327 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
2003); Jan-Philip Elm, Behavioral Insights into International Arbitration: An Analysis of How to De-Bias
Arbitrators, 27 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 74 (2016); Ernest A. Haggard & Soia Mentschikoff, Responsible Decision
Making in Dispute Settlement, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES 277 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); Lucy Reed, The 2013 Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre Kaplan Lecture–Arbitral Decision-Making: Art, Science or Sport?, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 85
(2013); Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision Making: Unconscious Psychological Influences and What You Can
Do About Them?, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 487 (2013). A study published after this article was accepted for
publication experimentally explores the cognitive illusions of a small group of domestic arbitrators. Rebecca
Helm, Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Are Arbitrators Human?, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 666
(2016).
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Given existing research on judges, we began our study with five descriptive
research hypotheses designed to shed light on the extent to which arbitrators
make intuitive, impressionistic decisions or deliberative and fully rational
decisions:
1. International arbitrators solve generic problems in an intuitive, rather than
deliberative, manner.
2. When faced with a concrete international dispute, international arbitrators are
influenced by relevant and irrelevant numeric anchors when awarding
damages.
3. International arbitrators respond more strongly to the possibility of losses and
less strongly to the possibility of gains when deciding disputes.
4. International arbitrators resolve disputes based on representative cues rather
than deliberative reason.
5. International arbitrators are prone to egocentric bias when evaluating
themselves and the disputes they address.
We also sought, where possible, to compare arbitrators to national judges
who responded to similar hypothetical vignettes in earlier research. Because we
did not provide the same problems to judges and arbitrators, and because we did
not test them at the same time, we are limited in our ability to make statistically
valid comparisons. Where comparison seemed legitimate, we hypothesized that
judges would outperform arbitrators, rendering more deliberative decisions.84
B. International Arbitrators: Participants
Our target population was international arbitrators. Unlike national judges,
there is no unified repository identifying all individuals willing to serve, or with
a history of serving, as an international arbitrator. This is, in part, because the
international arbitration community changes frequently and unpredictably as
people enter and exit the profession.85
We sampled arbitrators attending the prestigious biennial Congress of the
International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) in 2014 in Miami.
These participants had no special interest in psychology or psychological
84

Given the elite and competitive international arbitration market, our research hypothesis could have been
that arbitrators exhibit superior cognition. Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing tests both hypotheses, as the
objective is to identify group differences.
85 See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 81, at 12, 28, 61, 117, 157, 242, 248, 296 (1996); Catherine A.
Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 167
(1998).

FRANCK ET AL. GALLEYPROOFS3

1132

6/7/2017 9:45 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1115

research.86 ICCA is an important group in the international arbitration
community, and the biennial ICCA Congress is a prominent event that many
international arbitrators attend. ICCA therefore provided a singular opportunity
to research international arbitrators.87
At the 2014 ICCA conference, 1031 professionals registered for the
Congress.88 Based on cross-referencing registered participants with publicly
available information,89 we identified 496 registrants (roughly 48% of attendees)
with experience as an international arbitrator.
We administered materials to all registrants attending the first plenary
session. After excluding four individuals requesting their responses be omitted
from published research, 548 international arbitration specialists completed the
experiment. As our hypotheses involved the cognition of international
arbitrators, rather than counsel,90 we excluded responses from subjects who had
never acted as an arbitrator.91 We therefore analyzed responses from 262
individuals who self-identified as having been an arbitrator92 in at least one ICA
or ITA dispute.93 These participants represented roughly 48% of all registrants
86 ICCA is a prestigious non-governmental organization of the international arbitration bar. ICCA’s
governing board includes prominent arbitrators, the ICSID secretary general, past presidents of the American
Society of International Law, Principal Legal Counsel for the Government of Mexico in negotiating NAFTA,
General Counsel of ExxonMobil, Attorney General of Kenya, Pakistan’s former Attorney General, Singapore’s
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chair of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Director of the
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, and authors of several core international
arbitration treatises. Franck et al., supra note 4, at 441; Franck, et al., International Arbitration: Demographics,
Precision and Justice, in LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 18, at
33, 579 [hereinafter Franck et al., ICCA MIAMI CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS]. None of the authors are ICCA
members.
87 Franck et al., supra note 4, at 44042.
88 See Franck et al., supra note 4, at 441 & n.35 (noting, as twelve registrants worked on the research team
and two people reviewed earlier drafts, “only 1,017 of the registrants were capable of answering the survey”).
ICCA Congress Proceedings reflect the large, transnational attendees. List of Participants, in LEGITIMACY:
MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 18, at 1041 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2015).
89 We cross-referenced attendee lists with past arbitrator activity in Who’s Who Legal, Chambers &
Partners, IAI Paris, Global Arbitration Review, company websites, and Google searches. Special thanks is owed
to Stephanie Miller, a research librarian at Washington & Lee University School of Law where the lead author
formerly worked, for undertaking this background research.
90 Future research might explore counsel, or the cognition of others in international arbitration, including
insurers, third-party funders, experts, parties, or policy makers.
91 When analyzing those serving as counsel, results tended to be similar. A full discussion of variations
between counsel and arbitrators is beyond the scope of this Article. As arbitrators serve as counsel—and
international arbitrators are drawn from the arbitration bar—similarities would be unsurprising.
92 By walking up and down the rows in a large conference hall, we visually observed that many of the
subjects completing the survey were arbitrators. Franck et al., supra note 4, at 443.
93 Some participants failed to state they were ICA or ITA arbitrators. Id. at 448 n.57.
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returning materials and 53% of arbitrators registered for the ICCA Congress.94
Sixty-seven ITA arbitrators responded. This represents a reasonable proportion
(27%) of known ITA arbitrators.95
The arbitrator sample included 46 (17.6%) women and 216 (82.4%) men.96
The average age of an arbitrator was 54,97 and the average male arbitrator was
reliably older than the average female.98 Most of the international arbitrators
were from a developed country.99 Despite data collection in Miami, the largest
proportion (48%) of arbitrators were European,100 and English was the primary
native language of 43.3%.101 For legal training, 38.5% of arbitrators were
exclusively trained in common law, 33.8% were exclusively trained in civil law,
and 27.7% had training in both common and civil law. Arbitrators in our sample
had decided thirty-five cases on average.102
C. Experimental Method
We created stimulus materials to assess arbitrators’ decisionmaking by
asking them to resolve mock disputes using brief case vignettes. We created
scenarios mirroring realistic international commercial and investment disputes
and then used the arbitrators’ responses to those scenarios to assess arbitration

94

Id. at 443 n.44.
See SUSAN D. FRANCK, MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (forthcoming)
(coding ITA arbitrators on tribunals rendering public awards); Puig, supra note 82, at 403 (coding ICSID
arbitrator appointments and identifying 419 arbitrators).
96 Franck et al., supra note 4, at 453.
97 Id.
98 The mean age was 55.8 for male arbitrators, and 47.5 for female arbitrators. Id. at 45355. The age
difference was statistically significant and medium-sized. Id. at 454. The gender demographics and age
breakdown have been replicated by research from practitioners. For example, the International Chamber of
Commerce—one of the world’s preeminent international arbitration institutions—recently identified that about
10% of their arbitrators were female, and female arbitrators were generally younger than male arbitrators. Mirèze
Philippe, Speeding Up the Path for Gender Equality, 14 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Jan. 2017, at 4; see also
Lucy Greenwood & C. Mark Baker, Is the Balance Getting Better? An Update on the Issue of Gender Diversity
in International Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 413 (2015) (identifying historical gender balance issues in the field
of arbitration and recent efforts, both internal and external, to redress the balance).
99 This was true irrespective of whether “development status” derived from arbitrators’ nationality using
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, or United Nations Development
Programme Human Development Index definitions. Franck et al., supra note 4, at 45865.
100 Id. at 45960. Largest representation came from the United States (23.2%), United Kingdom (9.6%),
France (8.8%), Brazil (7.2%), Switzerland (5.6%), Germany (4.8%), and Canada (4.8%). Id.
101 Id. at 45859. Other dominant primary languages were German (10.6%), French (10.2%), Portuguese
(8.3%) and Spanish (7.1%). Id. Of the 205 participants fluent in a second language, 60.5% (n = 124) spoke
English, French 20.5% (n = 42), Spanish 7.3% (n = 15), and German 2% (n = 4).
102 The median was ten. The 25th and 75th percentile appointment levels were three and forty. Id. at 450.
95
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decisionmaking. We followed protocols used in prior studies of judges—
including U.S. state court judges,103 U.S. federal court judges,104 U.S.
bankruptcy judges,105 U.S. magistrates,106 U.S. administrative law judges,107
Canadian judges,108 Dutch judges,109 and Swiss judges.110
We presented a panel at the first plenary session entitled “Arbitration and
Decision-Making: Live Empirical Study.”111 The title was intentionally vague
to avoid revealing our research topic before participants responded. At the
beginning of the panel, we offered attendees the opportunity to complete a
confidential survey. All attendees were orally instructed on protocols, including
requests to read the survey, to take the materials seriously, to respond to each
question in order, and to work independently without reference to others or
internet searches.112 We asked participants to complete the survey and instructed
them not to identify themselves. We then distributed randomized surveys.
The survey materials began with a one-page instruction and consent form.
The first page asked participants to read and respond to the questions
independently and without discussing it with others, informed them that
participation was voluntary and explained we intended to use responses during
a follow-up presentation at the Congress.113 The five remaining pages contained
103 Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 10–11; Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski,
Disregarding, supra note 77, at 1279–82.
104 Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, Heart, supra note 80, at 874–76; Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski,
Disregarding, supra note 77, at 1281–82.
105 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1227, 1230–32 (2006); see also Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, Contrition, supra note 80, at 1208–09
(evaluating apologies and adjudication for bankruptcy judges).
106 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 786–77.
107 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1491–94.
108 Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, Heart, supra note 80, at 874–76; Rachlinski, Wistrich & Guthrie,
Distorted Damages, supra note 78, at 720.
109 Rachlinski, Wistrich & Guthrie, Distorted Damages, supra note 78, at 726.
110 Mark Schweizer, Kognitive Täuschungen vor Gericht [Cognitive Illusions in Court], DISSERTATION
ZÜRICH (2005), http://www.decisions.ch/dissertation/diss_methode.html (analyzing Swiss judges through mail
surveys).
111 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA Miami Congress 2014 Working
Programme (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/2/14334105310240/icca_website_schedule_
03.27.14.pdf.
112 We provided instructions orally and on the first page. See International Council for Commercial
Arbitration, Monday Plenary—ICCA Miami Congress 2014, ARBITRATION-ICCA.ORG (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/conferences-and-congresses/ICCA_MIAMI_2014-video-coverage/ICCA_
MIAMI_2014_Plenary_Session_7_April.html (36:52–43:22).
113 Subjects had the option to avoid use of their data in published research; four participants exercised this
option. Cf. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 787 (noting one judge of 168 declined to have
responses used).
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the survey materials; four pages pertained to the experiment and the remaining
page asked questions related to Congress themes of legitimacy and precision.114
For the experimental materials, each participant received questions to test our
hypotheses.115 To create controlled experimental conditions, although neither
the introductory instructions nor the first page indicated this, we devised
multiple versions of several scenarios which were randomly assigned to
participants. Subjects had approximately thirty-five minutes to complete the
survey. During survey administration, participants remained in the room, kept
silent, and appeared to take the process seriously.
All session attendees returned the survey—whether fully completed,
partially completed, or left blank—before leaving the plenary session. In total,
98.2% of the attendees answered at least one question.
III. RESULTS
We found evidence that arbitrators, like judges, tended to make intuitive
decisions and were influenced by well-known cognitive illusions like anchoring,
framing, and the like. Where comparisons with judges were possible, we were
generally unable to reliably distinguish between the responses of arbitrators and
judges, suggesting the two groups performed comparably.116 We also found
evidence that arbitrators, as a group, were unlikely to merely “split the baby”
between claimants and respondents. Taken together, the findings cast doubt on
the bona fides of the normative narrative that international arbitrators should be
stripped of jurisdiction and replaced by judges due to cognitive predisposition.
A. Testing the Intuitive-Override Model
We hypothesized that international arbitrators, like their judicial
counterparts, make decisions using an “intuitive-override” model117 whereby
arbitrators may initially make an intuitive assessment that they could ultimately
114 Demographic information and survey questions involving Congress themes are described elsewhere.
Franck et al., ICCA MIAMI CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 86, at 57–60; Franck et al., supra note 4, at
440–45.
115 We created the materials over two years and beta-tested them on law students in St. Gallen, Switzerland,
and Lexington, Virginia.
116 There were only two instances when international arbitrators outperformed judges, namely one test
comparing Cognitive Reflection Test scores with one group of state court judges and the representativeness
hypothetical. See infra notes 132–35, 226. The two times we identified a reliable difference, the practical
significance of the difference was small. The evidence, as measured and analyzed in our studies, never
demonstrated that the intuitive cognition of international arbitrators was inferior to judges.
117 See supra note 77 (discussing the intuitive-override model of adjudication).
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override using more rational and deliberative cognition. To test this hypothesis,
we administered the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a simple test of
deliberative reasoning described below.
1. CRT
Economist Shane Fredrick developed the CRT to test whether
decisionmaking involves dual processing118 where subjects have “the ability or
disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind.”119 The CRT
asks three questions. For each question, there is an intuitive but incorrect answer,
as well as a correct answer that is easy to discern upon reflection.
The first CRT question is: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” The intuitive response,
10¢, is mathematically incorrect. If the bat costs US$1 more than 10¢ (US$1.10)
and the ball is 10¢, the total cost is US$1.20. The correct answer is 5¢, with a
bat costing US$1.05 and a ball costing 5¢.120 The calculation is relatively easy,
but the analysis requires deliberation to avoid generating inadvertent error.
The second CRT question is: “If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5
widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?”121 The
intuitive answer is 100, but this is wrong. Deliberation reveals that if five
machines make five widgets in five minutes, then each machine makes a single
widget in five minutes. With that base rate, one can calculate it takes five
minutes for 100 machines to make 100 widgets.122
The final CRT question asks: “In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every
day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire
lake, how long would it take the patch to cover half of the lake?”123 The intuitive
(and incorrect) answer is twenty-four days. Using slower cognition to override
snap judgments reveals the correct answer is forty-seven days. If the rate of
growth means the amount doubles every day, compounding means half the lake
was covered the day before (i.e., day forty-seven, not day forty-eight).

118 Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, 49, 51–52 (Thomas
Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
119 Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 25, 35.
120 Id. at 27, 37.
121 Id. at 26–27.
122 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 10–11.
123 Frederick, supra note 119, at 27.
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We analyzed responses from the arbitrators who answered all three
questions.124 International arbitrators’ average CRT score was 1.47,125 which
exceeds mean CRT scores of judges participating in prior studies as shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Overall CRT Results – Arbitrators Compared to Judges and Others (n)
Sample (n)

Mean

0 Correct
Answers
7%
25%

1 Correct
Answer
16%
25%

2 Correct
Answers
30%
25%

3 Correct
Answers
48%
25%

MIT students (61)
Carnegie-Mellon
students (746)126
International
Arbitrators (239)
North American
Lawyers (247)127
Administrative
Law Judges (126)128
Florida Judges (252)129
University of Michigan:
Ann Arbor students
(1267)130
Web-based
Online Studies (525)131

2.18
1.51

1.46

24.3%
(58)
24.3%

24.7%
(59)
26.3%

30.5%
(73)
28.3%

20.5%
(49)
21.1%

1.33

30.2%

27.8%

20.6%

21.4%

1.23
1.18

30.6%
31%

31.0%
33%

23.8%
23%

14.7%
14%

1.10

39%

25%

22%

13%

1.47

124 Not all researchers code CRT responses the same way. Frederick did not indicate whether his totals
included subjects failing to answer a question. Acknowledging it could inflate mean CRT scores, others exclude
answers for judges failing to answer all three items. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at
14–15 n.81; Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 571, 586 (2013). To permit comparison with judges, we followed Guthrie et al.’s coding conventions.
125 Eleven arbitrators opted not to complete CRT questions (n = 251; SD = 1.07). Table 1 excludes subjects
failing to answer all three questions. When including non-answers, CRT score was slightly lower (M = 1.44;
SD = 1.07; n = 251), supporting the theory that coding affects CRT scores. For the expanded sample, 25.1% got
zero correct (n = 63), 25.5% got one correct (n = 64), 29.9% got two correct (n = 75), and 19.5% got all three
items correct (n = 49).
126 See Frederick, supra note 119, at 29 (reporting results from MIT and CMU).
127 See Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 124, at 585–87 (evaluating lawyers from Oregon, Texas, and
Ontario in the insurance sector).
128 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1499–500.
129 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 14–15.
130 Frederick, supra note 119, at 29.
131 Id.
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While it appears that international arbitrators slightly outperformed U.S.
judges on the CRT, we found a statistically meaningful difference between the
arbitrators and the Florida state court judges only,132 not between the arbitrators
and ALJs.133 These mixed results warrant caution in drawing any inferences that
arbitrator reasoning is superior to judicial reasoning.134 Moreover, the practical
significance of any difference was minimal, as effects were statistically small.135
In addition, international arbitrators and judges were similarly likely to select
the intuitive, but incorrect, responses to the CRT questions. Florida state judges
nearly always selected the intuitively incorrect answer for the bat-and-ball
question, and more than half of their responses for other questions were the
intuitive responses suggested by the problem. Likewise, ALJs, as specialist
adjudicators, tended to provide intuitive but incorrect responses.136 Arbitrators’
responses mimicked this pattern. Of the 158 arbitrators providing the incorrect
answer on the bat-and-ball problem, 87.3% provided the intuitive answer;137 on
the widget problem, 62% of the 121 arbitrators providing an incorrect response
identified the intuitive answer; and on the lily-pad problem, 69.8% of the 86
arbitrators providing incorrect answers gave the intuitive response as shown in
Table 2.

132 Using a test comparing correct CRT responses for 239 arbitrators and 252 Florida judges, there was a
meaningful difference; and arbitrators obtained a higher a proportion of correct responses (χ2(3) = 7.92;
p = 0.048; r = 0.13; n = 491).
133 A test comparing correct total number of CRT responses for 239 arbitrators and 126 ALJs was unable
to detect reliable difference (χ2(3) = 4.42; p = 0.22; r = 0.11; n = 365). Given the smaller ALJ sample, the null
result may derive from low power. The comparison between arbitrators and judges had less than 50% power,
which is below the accepted 80% threshold. Given the small effect size, sample of 781 arbitrators should have
requisite power.
134 Although the CRT items judges and arbitrators received were textually identical, temporal differences
in administration and other factors limit the strength of inferences directly comparing judges and arbitrators. See,
e.g., Maggie E. Toplak, Richard F. West & Keith E. Stanovich, Assessing Miserly Information Processing: An
Expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test, 20, THINKING & REASONING 147, 149 (2014) (expressing concern
about use of the CRT given its increasing exposure).
135 According to Cohen, effect sizes (r-values) up to 0.10 are “small,” 0.11 to 0.30 are “medium,” and 0.31
to 0.50 are “large.” JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 79–80 (2d
ed. 1988). The effect sizes, when comparing arbitrators to U.S. judges, were close to r = 0.10. See supra notes
132–33.
136 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1499–500; see also Wistrich &
Rachlinski, supra note 124, at 587 (“Among the lawyers who got the questions wrong, 94.9 percent (149 out of
157), 58.1 percent (seventy-two out of 124), and 62.6 percent (sixty-two out of ninety-nine) chose the intuitive
responses (ten cents, one hundred minutes, and twenty-four days) to the three questions, respectively.”).
137 For incorrect non-intuitive responses, most answers included numerical figures. Some responses,
however, included written comments such as “No way to know.”

FRANCK ET AL. GALLEYPROOFS3

2017]

6/7/2017 9:45 AM

INSIDE THE ARBITRATOR’S MIND

1139

Table 2: CRT Results—Subjects Providing Incorrect Responses from Samples
of 239 International Arbitrators, 252 Generalist Judges, and 126 ALJs138
Number of
Participants
Answering
Incorrectly
Question 1:
International
Arbitrators
Generalist
Judges
ALJs
Question 2:
International
Arbitrators
Generalist
Judges
ALJs
Question 3:
International
Arbitrators
Generalist
Judges
ALJs

Incorrect Answer
Giving Any Other
Response (n)

158

Incorrect
Answer Giving
Intuitive
Response (n)
10 Cents
87.3% (138)

181

96.7% (175)139

3.3% (6)

79

6.3% (5)

121

93.7% (74)
100 Minutes
62.0% (75)

38% (46)

141

57.5% (81)

42.5% (60)

74

47.3% (35)

86

52.7% (39)
24 Days
69.8% (60)

125

68.0% (85)

32.0% (40)

57

63.2%140 (36)

36.8% (21)

12.7% (20)

30.2% (26)

3. Synthesis
International arbitrators provided predominantly intuitive responses on the
CRT. These results cast doubt upon narratives that arbitrators always analyze
problems in fully rational ways. Like the judges who have been studied,
arbitrators, as a whole, did not perform well on this relatively easy test. Although
some individual arbitrators and judges showed an ability to overcome intuition
with deliberation in some circumstances, members of both groups gravitated
toward intuitive and impressionistic decisionmaking.
138 Judge data derived from Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 15–16, and data
from ALJs derived from Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1499–500, and the
original dataset.
139 Blinking incorrectly calculated the percentage as “88.4%,” but the stated proportions (“175 of 181
judges”) were accurate. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 15–16.
140 Upon reviewing the original dataset, the 64.9% reported in Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden
Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1500, was incorrect.
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The CRT is not a test of legal reasoning, but scholars have identified reliable
links between CRT and legal decisions.141 For instance, judges performing well
on the CRT performed well on an evidentiary inference problem based on Byrne
v. Boadle.142 Below, we explore whether arbitrators, like judges, tended to make
intuitive judgments when confronted not with a general test like the CRT but
when confronted with hypothetical disputes similar to those they confront in
their professional capacity.
B. Anchoring: Irrelevant and Relevant Anchors
Anchoring is a form of intuitive decisionmaking involving numerical
estimates. When people make estimates, they tend to rely upon an initial value
that is readily available, which “anchors” subsequent numerical estimations,
even when the initial figure is irrelevant or an intentional distractor.143 While
people can adjust away from initial anchors with deliberation, they often fail to
adjust sufficiently. Thus, anchors, including both reasonable and completely
unreasonable anchors, often have an outsized impact on final estimates.
Kahneman & Tversky’s “wheel of fortune” experiment demonstrated the
impact of irrelevant anchors on estimates.144 In this classic study, researchers
spun a wheel of fortune to generate a random number and then asked subjects to
estimate the percentage of African states in the United Nations. Subjects’
responses were biased towards the initial value provided by the wheel of fortune,
even though that number had absolutely nothing to do with African
representation in the United Nations. Even when individuals are paid for
assessments145 and when information is updated,146 anchoring persists.
141 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 DEPAUL L. REV.
413, 420 (2011). Judges performing on the CRT did well on an evidential inference problem based on Byrne v.
Boadle. Id.; see also Toplak, West & Stanovich, supra note 134, at 149 (“Shockingly, since it is based on just
three items, the CRT has proven to be a potent predictor of performance on rational thinking tasks.”).
142 We also used this hypothetical. See infra notes 217–24.
143 See generally JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS:
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 71–72 (2012);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128
(1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment]; see also Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra
note 77, at 19–21; Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 790–94; Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski,
Disregarding, supra note 77, at 1286–93.
144 Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 143.
145 Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief
and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, 120, 125–26 (Thomas
Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
146 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Heuristic Strategies for Estimation Under Uncertainty: The
Enigmatic Case of Anchoring, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION 79, 80 (Galen V. Bodenhausen & Alan
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Previous research has demonstrated that anchors affect both generalist and
specialist U.S. adjudicators. One experiment asked judges to analyze damages
after learning about a plaintiff who suffered serious injuries from a car crash
(including several months of hospitalization and being confined later to a
wheelchair) due to a truck driver’s negligence. It then asked judges to rule on a
motion to dismiss and assess damages. The control group was given a basic
request for a damage assessment, but judges in the experimental condition were
also told the defendant claimed the US$75,000 amount-in-controversy
requirement was not satisfied.147 The natural anchor—US$75,000—affected
judges’ damage assessments, with judges in the experimental condition
awarding roughly 30% less than judges in the control condition.148 In another
study, ALJs assessed damages in employment discrimination where the
applicable law permitted compensation for mental anguish and emotional
distress. The hypothetical included testimony from the plaintiff that she suffered
from “anxiety, sleeplessness, and bad dreams” and she mentioned, as an aside,
that she had recently seen a “court TV show featuring a case she claimed was
similar to hers.”149 Whereas some judges simply learned the plaintiff discussed
the irrelevant TV show, others learned the compensatory damage in the “court
TV show” was US$415,300. Once again, data revealed anchors affected damage
assessments; the mean award was twice as large for ALJs exposed to an
irrelevant anchor.150 Recent research has demonstrated irrelevant anchors
likewise influenced judges from Canada, the Netherlands, and Germany.151
In transnational adjudication, relevant anchors are useful when they are
grounded in fact or law, but irrelevant anchors create risk of error and injustice.
In cases where the financial consequences are meaningful for one or both
parties—such as damage assessments in large transnational commercial or
investment disputes—irrelevant anchors pose particularly pernicious risks. We
set out to examine these risks by developing two vignettes to test the impact of
anchors on arbitrator decisionmaking. Whereas the first hypothetical tests

J. Lambert eds., 2003); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59
VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2026 (2006); Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and
Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 597, 597–98 (2006).
147 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 789–92.
148 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 21.
149 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1502–03.
150 Id. at 1504–06.
151 See Rachlinski, Wistrich & Guthrie, Distorted Damages, supra note 78; see also id. at 710 & n.99
(describing unpublished research demonstrating anchors influenced Taiwanese judges).
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relevant anchors, the second hypothetical tests irrelevant anchors. In both
scenarios, anchoring had a significant effect on outcomes.
1. Relevant Anchor: Materials and Results
One hypothetical tested two relevant anchors and also offered us an
opportunity to test experimentally whether arbitrators “split the baby” when
presented with two damage assessments. Nevertheless, quantitative analyses of
real awards revealed that arbitrators did not render compromise awards,152 but
the longstanding myth persists153 that arbitrators ignore the merits and “split the
baby.”154
To test for the impact of a relevant anchor on arbitral decisionmaking, we
created a hypothetical involving the commercialization of beachfront property
where a developer created a project for low-density, ecologically responsible
land development.155 Later, however, the state where the land was located passed
legislation prohibiting the developer from enjoying the beneficial use of the
property. In the scenario, all parties—both the investor and the state—agreed a
compensable expropriation occurred. The only question was damages. The
vignette provided the applicable law, namely that compensation due was for the
152 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 663, 665, 673–77 (2008)
(identifying the “split the baby” myth of arbitration but providing contradictory empirical evidence); Stephanie
E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”—Empirical Evidence from International
Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573, 574–75 (2001) (analyzing arbitration awards to observe, overall,
tribunals awarded roughly 47%–50% of claimed amounts but identifying that the average figure masked a
bimodal distribution where tribunals either rendered awards in favor of either claimant or respondent); Carter
Greenbaum, Putting the Baby to Rest: Dispelling a Common Arbitration Myth, 26 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 101,
101 (2015) (providing empirical data that “the incidence of compromise awards in commercial arbitration is
insignificant”).
153 See supra note 7; DOUGLAS SHONTZ, FRED KIPPERMAN & VANESSA SOMA, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST.,
BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, at x, 7–
12 (2011), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf (identifying
that parties’ “overwhelming believe that arbitrators tend to ‘split the baby’ with their rulings—that is, they are
unwilling to rule strongly for one party”). The history, scope, strength, and persistence of the “split the baby”
myth is a topic of quantitative analysis beyond the scope of this Article. We nevertheless observe that many
commentators continue to discuss this problem. See, e.g., Zela G. Claiborne, Top Five Myths about Commercial
Arbitration, JAMS (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.jamsadr.com/publications/2015/top-five-myths-aboutcommercial-arbitration; AM. ARB. ASS’N, SPLITTING THE BABY: A NEW AAA STUDY (2007), https://www.adr.
org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_014040; Ana Carolina Weber et al., Challenging the “Splitting the Baby”
Myth in International Arbitration, 31 J. INT’L ARB. 719 (2014).
154 Drahozal, supra note 152, at 675; Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 454 (2007).
155 To enhance the external validity of the scenario, we patterned it after other cases confronting relevant
anchors to assess the value of beach front property. Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica,
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000); Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/08/1,
ARB/09/20, Award (May 16, 2012).

FRANCK ET AL. GALLEYPROOFS3

2017]

6/7/2017 9:45 AM

INSIDE THE ARBITRATOR’S MIND

1143

“fair market value”, or “what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller for
the best use of the property.” Arbitrators were then instructed to resolve the
dispute as if they were a sole arbitrator. We told arbitrators that both parties
submitted credible expert reports referencing historical data from real estate
sales, listing prices of the original property, sunk costs, market data on the
demand for beach rental property, and the potential profits of ecologicallyfriendly developments in similar states. The only difference between the
scenarios subjects received was the valuation in expert reports. In all versions,
the respondent state that had expropriated the property asserted the land value
was US$1 million. In the low anchor condition, the developer claimed damages
of US$10 million; and in the high anchor condition, the developer claimed
US$50 million.
Measures of central tendency reflected the influence of relevant anchors.
While the mean award for all answers was roughly US$16 million,156 there was
meaningful variation in damage assessments for low and high anchors.157
Arbitrators in the high anchor condition made reliably larger awards. Whereas
the average award in the high anchor condition was nearly US$24.8 million,158
the mean award for arbitrators in the low anchor condition was roughly US$5.8
million.159
At first blush, damage awards might appear to support a “split the baby”
hypothesis, as—for both conditions—mean awards were roughly halfway
between the values of the two expert reports. The difference between the
competing expert reports in the low anchor condition should generate a
compromise award of US$5.5 million,160 which was similar to the US$5.8
million mean. Likewise, splitting the difference between the experts in the high

156

M = 16,430,556; n = 90; SD = 16,942,692.
A t-test revealed meaningful variation (t(96) = -6.844; p < 0.001; r = 0.57; n = 98). It was not necessary
to transform damages, as skewness (1.06) was acceptable. Results remained significant using a non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U-test of medians (U = 1548; p < 0.001). The smaller n reflects subjects randomly received
either a beach-front anchoring hypothetical or settlement framing hypothetical.
158 M = 24,773,585; n = 53; SD = 18,314,970. For the high anchor, the 25th percentile was US$ 7,500,000
the median was US$25,000,000, and the 75th percentile was US$44,500,000.
159 M = 5,794,444; n = 45; SD = 3,451,486. For the low anchor, the 25th percentile was US$2,500,000, the
median was US$50,000,000, and the 75th percentile was US$10,000,000.
160 The difference between the two expert reports was US$9 million, so 50% is US$4.5 million. By adding
US$4.5 million to the state’s US$1 million valuation or subtracting US$4.5 million from the developer’s US$10
million claim creates a compromise award of US$5.5 million.
157
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anchor condition would create a US$25.5 million161 award, which was similar
to the reported US$24.8 million mean. Further analysis, however, reveals the
visual similarity is an oversimplification that hides fundamental variance in
arbitrator decisionmaking.
We used arbitrators’ responses to calculate whether an award was a
compromise between the two expert valuations. This meant an arbitrator
rendered an award precisely 50% between the two expert valuations, when it
rendered a US$5.5 million award in the low anchor condition or US$25.5 million
in the high anchor condition. Where arbitrators awarded US$1 million, this was
a 0% award, as damages fully reflected respondent’s expert. When damages
were in line with claimant’s expert, the arbitrator awarded 100%. Other
proportions reflected arbitrators’ awards and degree of compromise.162
Irrespective of experimental condition, tests were unable to identify
meaningful differences in subjects’ proportionate responses.163 In other words,
there was no evidence that anchoring affected the relative proportions awarded.
This, in turn, suggests arbitrators’ propensity to award compromise awards was
equivalent across conditions.164
The responses revealed variation in damage assessments. Figure 1 reflects
less than half of arbitrators (41.8%; n = 41) awarded investors more than 50%
of the claimed damages; and as reflected by red shades, more than half
arbitrators (56.1%; n = 55) awarded investors less than 50% of claimed
damages. Only 2% (n = 2) of arbitrators rendered pure compromise award that
precisely “split the baby” between the two expert reports. Instead, one of the
largest sub-groups of responses came from arbitrators awarding 40%–49% of
damages.165

161

The difference between the two reports was US$49 million, so 50% is US$24.5 million. Adding US$24.5
million to the state’s US$1 million valuation or subtracting US$24.5 million from the developer’s US$50 million
claim creates a compromise award of US$25.5 million.
162 To calculate the percentage, we subtracted US$1 million from awarded damages (to address
respondent’s concession of a US$1 million valuation). For the low anchor, we divided that amount by US$9
million; for the high anchor, we divided by US$49 million, the respective spreads between the two reports.
163 The proportions exhibited acceptable skewness (0.03) and required no transformation. With two
experimental conditions, a t-test analyzed group differences in the high and low anchor groups; and the test was
unable to identify a meaningful difference (t(96) = 0.625; p = 0.53; r = 0.06; n = 98).
164 The analysis lacked sufficient power to conclude there was no effect of anchoring on proportion
awarded. Given the small effect size (r = 0.06), a priori power analysis reveals a sample of over 781 arbitrators
would be required to make inferences about a null result.
165 Five arbitrators awarded 49%, two arbitrators awarded 48%, and ten arbitrators awarded 44%. Five
arbitrators awarded 39%. One awarded 33%.
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The two largest responses did not reflect a compromise between the parties’
claims. Rather, the most common response involved arbitrators taking an “allor-nothing” approach and following the expert report of one party. Leaving aside
the 5% of arbitrators who gave less than either party anticipated, 13% (n = 13)
of arbitrators rendered awards following respondent’s expert report, and 26.5%
(n = 26) of arbitrators used claimant’s expert report as the basis of damages.
These responses undermine claims that arbitrators, as a group, “split the baby.”
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Figure 1. Response Frequency: Arbitrators’ Proportionate Damage Awards
(n = 98).
While the data did not demonstrate arbitrators never “split the baby”—
arbitrators sometimes did precisely that—it does cast doubt on the universality
and prevalence of such a narrative. It is empirically wrong to suggest that
international arbitrators, as a group, exhibited monolithic tendencies. Rather, the
data suggest that conventional wisdom about arbitrator decisionmaking must be
replaced with an alternative theory.166 At best, there were three different
paradigms for international arbitrators, namely a group inclined to prioritize
claimant valuations, a group inclined to prioritize respondent valuations, and a
166 Judge Posner argues arbitrators seek to maximize appointments by rendering compromise awards.
Posner, supra note 7, at 1260; Richard Posner, What Do Arbitrators Maximize?, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND ECONOMICS AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN 123, 124–25 (Peter Nobel & Philipp von Ins eds., 2014) (“[T]here would be a
tendency of arbitrators to split the difference between the parties rather than side entirely with one party.”); see
also Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 110, 128 (1983)
(exploring the theoretical rational actor model). The data disrupted this theory, as a small group of arbitrators
rendered “split the baby” awards. More arbitrators rendered “all or nothing” or somewhat more respondentfavorable awards, suggesting an alternative theory is warranted to explain intuitive adjudication styles.
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group that was roughly in the middle but tended to render more respondentfavorable awards. It is, however, difficult to predict such propensities in advance
or how they might vary by context. Our hypothetical involved an ITA dispute;
it is possible—but by no means certain—that arbitrators behave differently in
ICA disputes.167 At a minimum, given the control parties have over the
appointment of one arbitrator, the data suggest parties should engage in due
diligence when making arbitrator appointments. Parties may even wish to
consider providing arbitrators in advance with cognitive assessments to identify
their intuitive predispositions and the capacity to override intuitive reasoning
with rationality.
2. Irrelevant Anchor: Materials and Results
One would hope that relevant anchors that have a nexus with the applicable
law and facts influence damage awards, as anchoring has the capacity to be
adaptive. The data demonstrated that the relevant anchors exerted this influence,
and none of the arbitrators made a damage award in excess of an investors’
expert report.168 This finding left open the question, however, of whether
irrelevant anchors—which risk improperly inflating damages—also influence
decisionmaking.
To test the influence of irrelevant anchors, we created a hypothetical dispute
involving a small transnational law firm (Law Firm) that, at its clients’ behest,
opened a local office in a new country. The host country, however, strictly
regulated the practice of law by foreign lawyers. A government raid on Law
Firm resulted in destruction of irreplaceable items (including a rare family photo
album and specialized technological equipment), incarceration of employees,
and deportation of foreign lawyers.169 Law Firm experienced adverse publicity,
damaged reputation, and lost clients. Law Firm then initiated ITA to recover
damages, claiming the host state failed to provide “fair and equitable treatment”

167 Studies regarding ICA, whereby commercial arbitrators also did not demonstrate a pure propensity to
“split the baby” in real cases, cast a degree of doubt on such a hypothesis. Compare supra notes 152–53, with
Figure 1.
168 We note, however, that five of the arbitrators awarded an amount for expropriation less than what the
respondent state conceded was due. See Figure 1. It is possible that these arbitrators had an intuitive approach
favoring states, did not closely read the question, or there was some other basis for the assessment.
169 Aspects of the hypothetical were similar to other disputes resolved by arbitration. Al-Kharafi & Sons
Co. v. Libya, (Kuwait v. Libya), Final Arbitral Award, 4–5 (Mar. 22, 2013); Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen
(Oman v. Yemen), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 4–10 (Feb. 6, 2008); Mitchell v. Democratic Republic
of the Congo (U.S. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the
Application for Annulment of the Award, 3 (Nov. 1, 2006).
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(FET). The Request for Arbitration requested moral damages, namely damages
for inchoate harms like duress, loss of reputation, or roughly equivalent to pain
and suffering.170 We asked arbitrators to assume they were the tribunal chair,
there was jurisdiction over the dispute, there was an FET violation, and the
calculation of damages rested on equitable principles under the applicable
international law standards.
Unbeknownst to arbitrators, they did not all receive the same version. Like
the experiment including information about an irrelevant “court TV show,” we
injected information about an irrelevant case171 with no bearing on the dispute.
Reflecting a common practice in international arbitration, the hypothetical
indicated: “After the final hearing, you go to dinner with your co-arbitrators to
relax. During dinner, as an aside, one of your co-arbitrators mentions a case
where a U.S. District Court applied U.S. domestic tort law to hold Sudan liable
for ____ to those injured by the bombing of a ship in Yemen.” We randomly
assigned arbitrators to one of four conditions. In the control group, arbitrators
received no information about the valuation of the unrelated U.S. tort case. In
contrast, three experimental conditions contained different valuations of the
irrelevant case, namely: (a) US$1 million in damages (a low anchor), (b) US$50
million in damages (a medium anchor), or (c) US$300 million in damages (a
high anchor). Arbitrators were asked: “How much do you award Law Firm in
moral damages for the FET violation?”
Irrelevant anchors influenced international arbitrators’ damage awards.
Using raw data, the average award was US$9.2 million,172 but damages varied
across conditions. The mean award in the control condition was roughly US$10
million.173 Mean awards in the low anchor condition were roughly US$5
million,174 and US$5.5 million in the medium anchor condition.175 The mean
raw award in the high anchor condition was US$16.3 million.176 Median awards
likewise reflected the influence of anchors. For both the control group and low-

170 See Matthew T. Parish, Annalise K. Nelson & Charles B. Rosenberg, Awarding Moral Damages to
Respondent States in Investment Arbitration, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 225, 225–30 (2011); Ben Saul,
Compensation for Unlawful Death in International Law: A Focus on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 523, 555–60 (2004).
171 The irrelevant anchor was based upon a case involving U.S. sailors injured during a bombing. Harrison
v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2012).
172 M = 9,168,2485; n = 218; SD = 29,366,890.
173 M = 10,347,348; n = 49; SD = 36,177,797.
174 M = 4,975,636; n = 55; SD = 18,903,177.
175 M = 5,478,068; n = 59; SD = 10,744,534.
176 M = 16,269,091; n = 55; SD = 41,659,270.
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anchor group, Figure 2 demonstrates the median award was US$100,000. By
contrast, the median award for both the medium anchor and high anchor groups
was US$1,000,000.
$1,100,000
$1,000,000
$900,000
$800,000
$700,000
$600,000
$500,000
$400,000
$300,000
$200,000
$100,000
$0
Control (n = 49)

$1M—Low Anchor
(n = 55)

$50M—Medium Anchor $300M—High Anchor
(n = 59)
(n = 55)

Figure 2. Median Award: Legal Services Hypothetical with Four Anchors.
In an effort to identify the nuance in the variation of damage awards, Table 3
offers a quartile distribution of the different awards across conditions.
Particularly in the 75th percentile, medium and high anchors appeared to swing
damages in an upward direction.
Table 3: Quartile Distributions of Damage Awards in Anchoring Conditions.
25th
Percentile
Control Condition:
No Anchor
Low Anchor
Condition:
US$1 million
Medium Anchor
Condition:
US$50 million
High Anchor
Condition:
US$300 million

75th
Percentile

Total
Sample

0

Median—
50th
Percentile
100,000

1,000,000

49

0

100,000

1,000,000

55

1,000

1,000,000

5,000,000

59

0

1,000,000

10,000,000

55
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To identify whether variations in damages were meaningful, we conducted a
between-groups Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).177 Because of positive
skewing, we transformed the data178 to ensure it met the assumptions of
statistical tests.179 The test revealed anchoring exerted a statistically significant
effect on international arbitrators’ damage awards.180
Not all anchors had the same effect, however. Conservative follow-up
comparisons181 identified that the high anchor was reliably influential. Damage
awards in the high anchor condition were meaningfully larger than awards from
arbitrators in either the control group or the low anchor condition.182 A more
liberal test183 suggested both the high and medium anchor were linked with
increased damages.184 It was never possible, however, to detect a reliable
difference between awards in the control group and low anchor condition.185 The
177 See TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 105–10 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining ANOVAs and
their proper use).
178 Winsorizing requires identifying and converting extreme values into the upper and lower bounds of the
distribution. W.J. Dixon, Simplified Estimation from Censored Normal Samples, 31 ANNALS MATH. STAT. 385,
385 (1960); John W. Tukey, The Future of Data Analysis, 33 ANNALS MATH. STAT. 1, 18–19 (1962).
Winsorizing identifies outliers using Tukey’s hinges, which computes low and high cutoffs, and replaces
outlying values with the upper and lower bounds of Tukey’s hinges. This reformulates data to fit test assumptions
but retains data. DAVID J. SHESHKIN, HANDBOOK OF PARAMETRIC AND NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL
PROCEDURES 403 (3d ed. 2004); Franck, supra note 82, at 456.
179 Skewness of the raw data was an unacceptable 5.17. After Winsorization, skewness was an acceptable
0.92.
180 The ANOVA results were significant (F(3217) = 4.696; p = 0.003; r = 0.25; n = 218). A non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test was marginally significant (χ2(3) = 7.203; p = 0.06; r = 0.18; n = 218). When combining the
control and the low anchor conditions, which appeared to operate similarly, a Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a
significant group difference (χ2(2) = 6.755; p = 0.03; r = 0.17; n = 218). When combining the medium and high
anchor conditions, which appeared to operate similarly, a Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant group
difference (χ2(2) = 7.166; p = 0.03; r = 0.18; n = 218).
181 Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) provides follow-up significance testing. FREDERICK J.
GRAVETTER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, ESSENTIALS OF STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 365 (6th ed.
2008).
182 HSD comparisons between the high anchor and: 1) the control group (p = 0.03) or 2) the low anchor
(p = 0.01) were meaningful. We could not find a meaningful difference when comparing awards in medium and
high anchor groups (p = 0.81).
183 A Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) test permits comparison of sub-groups for individual
group differences. LSD, however, is more likely to identify meaningful differences when compared to more
conservative HSD analyses.
184 For LSD comparisons using the medium anchor, the significant effect was comparing the medium
anchor and low anchor (p = 0.02). Comparing the medium anchor with the control group was marginally
significant (p = 0.05). Comparisons between medium and high anchors remained non-significant (p = 0.37).
185 For HSD comparisons between control and low anchor conditions, there was no significant effect
(p = 0.99); and for LSD, there was no identifiable effect (p = 0.74). Because of the proportion of responses in
the control condition where arbitrators rendered awards that were below the value provided in the “low” anchor
condition, these results have limited value in identifying the lack of an effect of a “low” anchor. Moreover, the
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significant results about high anchors nevertheless opens the possibility that, in
international arbitration, anchors must be sufficiently large to exert a meaningful
influence.
The results demonstrated that, like generalist and specialist judges,
anchoring influences international arbitrators. It is, unfortunately, not possible
to compare the influence of anchoring on arbitrators and judges directly, as
hypotheticals provided to the groups involved distinct legal questions, different
anchors, and different categories. Nevertheless, we can conclude with some
confidence that anchoring influenced both groups.
The results suggest that it may be prudent to explore reforming international
arbitration to require parties to plead damages with specificity at an early phase
(or otherwise provide detailed expert reports in advance) to justify amounts
claimed. As claimants are positioned to know their own damages and relevant
information is within their control, the burden of such a requirement is likely
minimal; and the potential benefit of creating procedural mechanisms to
minimize the pernicious effect of anchoring likely outweighs systemic costs.
Moreover, as ensuring there are thorough assessments of damages at the outset
of a case is consistent with best practices in international arbitration, it is likely
that quality counsel already conduct these analyses and consult with their clients
in advance about the costs-and-benefits of pursuing arbitration. Imposing formal
requirements—whether in institutional rules or party agreement—will therefore
not change the practice of many lawyers and will create incentives for quality in
others.
We also note that some of the international arbitrators were not fully content
with the brief information we provided when responding to the anchoring
questions. Among those responding to the beachfront property hypothetical
testing relevant anchors, 25% complained about insufficient information; among
those responding to the legal services hypothetical testing irrelevant anchors,
18.8% of arbitrators made manuscript comments complaining about insufficient
information to make a calculation. For the beachfront property dispute, one
subject noted that, “much depends upon quality of experts” and identified
concerns about the subjective aspects of what is a “willing buyer.” This,
however, also makes them somewhat similar to U.S. judges, as similar
proportions of judges who received one-page anchoring hypotheticals also
expressed discontent with the sufficiency of material provided.
lack of a statistically significant effect means that drawing reliable inferences about the absence of an effect is
problematic.
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Anchoring is a uniquely powerful phenomenon, but other information—
including other numbers, like the amounts claimed or expert reports with
relevant values—may minimize anchoring’s deleterious effects. Moreover,
arbitrators in live cases will have much more information about the parties and
the dispute. Opposing counsel will likely use opposing anchors in the course of
their advocacy, which one would hope would offer a relevant anchor based upon
the fact and law. International arbitrators also have the authority to ask questions
to test the integrity of anchors and to appoint experts. Even where anchors exert
a powerful influence, effects could be muted using existing procedures within
arbitration as debiasing tools.186
Although there are inevitable limitations, there are reasons to believe the
results are generalizable beyond the laboratory. Damage demands, whether by
claimants or respondents in a counter-claim, are salient anchors. Other research
has demonstrated that, even with more information or alternative anchors,
adjudicators were unable to fully disregard initial anchors. International
arbitrators do have time and opportunity to deliberate, but it is unclear whether
deliberation will ameliorate the effects of an anchor by encouraging deliberation
or exacerbate the effects of an anchor through group polarization.
C. Framing
The framing of options can influence how people make decisions.187 When
choosing between options that appear to be gains relative to the status quo,
people become risk avoiders, preferring a sure thing to a gamble. When choosing
between options that seem like losses relative to the current state of affairs,
people often make risk-seeking choices, rejecting a certain loss in favor of a

186 Normative reforms deriving from evidence-based insights are discussed in Section IV. Debiasing in
anchoring is notoriously difficult, as inoculants can create alternative anchors or facilitate over-correction. See
Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 1663, 1757 (2003); Rachlinski, Wistchrich & Guthrie, Distorted Damages, supra note 78, at 732–35;
Jeffery J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 603
(1998).
187 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341
(1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). But see James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects,
17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62 (2001) (suggesting framing can diminish or disappear when subjects obtain credible
information).
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gamble that might enable them to avoid losing anything at all. People find losses
more aversive and unfair than they find equivalent gains attractive and fair.188
In one illustrative study, researchers gave subjects the following problem:
“A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community experiencing
a recession with substantial unemployment . . . .”189 In the loss condition,
subjects learned there was “no inflation,” but the company was decreasing wages
by 7%. In the gain condition, subjects learned that there is “substantial
unemployment and inflation of 12%,” but the company decided “to increase
salaries by only 5%.”190 Researchers asked subjects to evaluate the fairness of
these options. Although employees’ real income shifts were approximately the
same, “judgments of fairness are strikingly different. A wage cut is coded as a
loss and consequently judged unfair. A nominal raise which does not
compensate for inflation is more acceptable because it is coded as a gain to the
employee . . . .”191
Researchers have found that framing influences both novice and expert
decisionmakers, including judges.192 We set out to examine whether it also
influences international arbitrators. We used two groups of framing scenarios to
test international arbitrators. The first set of hypotheticals involved more
traditional gain versus lost framing effects, which used a standard methodology
to request either a numerical price adjustment or a fairness adjustment. The
second hypothetical involved framing deriving from a contract rescission, which
also permitted exploration of the potential effect of arbitrator appointment on
commercial disputes.

188 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of
Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 307–08 (1992). Low-probability losses and gains can operate
differently. See Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 2017, 2034–35 (2006).
189 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 731–32.
192 See Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and
Reservation Values, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 293–97 (1995) (framing affects lawyers); Guthrie,
Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 796–97 (framing affects judges); Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the
Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1262 (1982) (framing affects
physicians); Devon G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face
of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 129, 155 (2011) (framing affects professional
golfers).
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1. Framing: Price Adjustment and Fairness Assessment
We tested whether arbitrators evaluated gain and loss frames differently
using a scenario involving an international price renegotiation dispute.193 In our
materials, two commercial entities—Outsourcer and Service Provider—had a
contract for IT-related services. The contract required periodic price adjustment,
but permitted pricing disputes to be resolved with arbitrators deciding ex aequo
et bono, which requires decisions based upon fairness and equitable principles,
and is a well-known basis for decision in international arbitration.194
We randomly assigned arbitrators to different conditions to explore the effect
of framing. In the loss version, arbitrators learned, “A group of prominent
economists predict that the economic outlook is muted with an inflation rate of
0%. Outsourcer proposes to cut its pay to Service Provider by 3%.” In the gain
version, arbitrators learned: “A group of prominent economists predict that the
economic outlook is bustling with an inflation rate of 5%. Outsourcer proposes
to increase its pay to Service Provider by 2%.” In both scenarios, the net
economic impact to Service Provider is a 3% difference in revenues.
Having presented the arbitrators with one of these two basic substantive
frames, we asked two different questions requiring them to assess the dispute.195
First, we asked a randomly assigned group of arbitrators to make a price
adjustment. We asked a second randomly assigned group of arbitrators to
evaluate the relative fairness of Outsourcer’s proposed price adjustment on a
four-point scale (from “completely fair” to “very unfair”).
We found that gain and loss frames affected arbitrators’ evaluations.
When asked to make price adjustments, the arbitrators in the gain condition
adjusted, on average, 4.44%, while those in the loss condition adjusted by an
193 Price review disputes, for example, are typical within the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., Julian Cardenas
Garcia, An Era of Petroleum Arbitration Mega Cases, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 537, 539 (2013); Christopher
Goncalves, Breaking Rules and Changing the Game: Will Shale Gas Rock the World?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 225, 251
(2014); Gas Price Renegotiation: A Sign of the Times, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/9/2/v2/92799/Gas-Price-Renegotiation-JAN2015.pdf; see also Suez v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 83 (July 30, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf (discussing price review disputes within the water distribution
and waste water treatment context).
194 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans
1153, 1187; Trakman, supra note 35, at 631–32.
195 One subset of arbitrators randomly received the price adjustment version and was randomly assigned to
the gain or loss condition; and another subset of arbitrators randomly received the fairness assessment version
and was randomly assigned to the gain or loss condition.
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average of only 1.03%196 as shown in Table 4. Stated simply, arbitrators in the
gain condition adjusted prices four times as much as those in the loss condition.
Table 4: Percentage of Price Adjustment when Framed as Loss or Gain.
Mean
Gain Condition:
5% Inflation and
2% Raise
Loss Condition:
0% Inflation and
3% Cut

Total

4.444

Standard
Deviation
1.838

1.030

3.414

50

65

Likewise, we also used the same Outsourcer and Service Provider scenario
to request fairness assessments. Rather than asking for a numerical decision, as
international arbitration law sometimes requires arbitrator to make assessments
based upon equitable principles, we asked the arbitrators to assess the fairness
of the modification. The results, illustrated in Table 5, demonstrated that framing
affected arbitrators’ fairness assessments.
Table 5: Fairness Evaluation of Price Disputes when Framed as Loss or Gain:
Percentage Giving Classification (n = number of responses).

Gain Condition:
5% Inflation and 2%
Raise
Loss Condition:
0% Inflation and 3%
Cut

Completely
Fair
6.3% (4)

Acceptable

Unfair

39.7% (25)

41.3%
(26)

1.6% (1)

25.4% (16)

65%
(41)

Very
Unfair
12.7% (8)

Total

8% (5)

63

63

Because so few arbitrators in both conditions identified Outsourcer’s
proposal as “Completely Fair,” we condensed the four-category variable into a
two-category variable. We combined responses evaluating the proposal as fair—
namely, Completely Fair and Acceptable—and responses evaluating the

196 A t-test analyzed identified reliable difference in price adjustments (t(135) = -6.875; p < 0.001; r = 0.54;
n = 115). Using Cohen’s conventions, the effect size was small-to-medium. See generally COHEN, supra note
135, 113–16.
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proposal as unfair—namely Unfair and Very Unfair, and then tested for
differences. We found evidence that framing affected arbitrators’ decisions.197
In short, arbitrators, like judges, were susceptible to the effects of framing.
Direct comparisons are not available, but based on a review of the prior studies
on judges,198 it appears that arbitrators were not more susceptible to framing.
2. Framing: Contract Rescission and Appointment
Framing creates asymmetries between parties in transactions (e.g., buyers
versus sellers), as well as parties embroiled in disputes (e.g., claimants versus
respondents). These natural frames might influence judges and arbitrators.199
In an unpublished study, Rachlinski and Wistrich found that framing affected
judges’ decisions.200 They gave Utah state judges a vignette involving a dispute
over a video game sale. Both litigants, who were attending a video game
convention, misunderstood the game’s value when concluding the contract. The
only issue was whether there was a mutual mistake about a basic assumption of
the contract warranting rescission. The hypothetical was analogous to Sherwood
v. Walker, where a mutual mistake by both parties voided a contract.201 In
Sherwood, the issue was whether the cow was fertile or infertile; and in the
hypothetical, the question was whether the goods being sold was a rare vintage
game or not.202

197 Condensing the categories into a 2x2 design, a Fisher’s exact test revealed that gain and loss frames
reliably influenced arbitrators’ fairness assessments (p = 0.04; r = 0.20; n = 126). Using Cohen’s conventions,
the effect size was small-to-medium. See id.
198 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1507–09; Rachlinski, Guthrie
& Wistrich, supra note 105, at 1240–41. For example, ALJs assessed framing in a different context using
identical categories. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1507–09. When
assessing economically equivalent rent payments framed as a gain (i.e., a discount) or a loss (i.e., a surcharge),
framing exerted a reliable effect on ALJs. Id. For judges in the gain condition responding to rent payments, 29%
evaluated the payment as “Completely Fair,” 67% evaluated rent payment as “Acceptable,” 5% evaluated the
assessment as “Unfair,” and 0% ranked the assessment “Very Unfair.” Id.; compare id., with Table 4.
199 Cf. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 1269 (2015) (experimental research on ordinary individuals in the United States reflected that intuitive
predispositions affected assessments of contract formation and also revealed a gap between existing U.S.
contract doctrine and colloquial understandings of contracts).
200 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Gains, Losses, and Judges: Framing and the Judiciary (Apr.
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
201 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
202 Id. at 923–24. Although a classic in contracts casebooks, Sherwood is of limited value in Michigan given
Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1981).
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Not all judges received the same version of the hypothetical. In one version,
both parties believed the video game had little value and the plaintiff was the
seller who sold the video game for US$1 but later learned it was worth
US$38,000. In the second version, both parties believed the video game had high
value and the plaintiff was the buyer who bought the videogame for US$38,000
but later learned it was worth US$1.203 Both scenarios asked judges to decide
whether to grant plaintiff’s summary judgment motion for rescission. Although
the applicable law arguably required rescission in both cases,204 framing
influenced judges’ willingness to rescind contracts. When the plaintiff was the
buyer (who paid US$38,000 for a worthless game), 82.3% (14 out of 17) of
judges rescinded the contract.205 In contrast, when the plaintiff was the seller
(who received US$1 for a valuable game), only 40.6% (13 out of 32) of judges
rescinded the contract.206
We developed an analogous scenario for the arbitrators participating in our
study.207 Rather than a video game contract, the dispute involved a five-year
concession contract to extract “all minerals” on a 2000 hectare site.
In one version, the concession was for a site named “LaKapa,” where both
parties believed the site contained iron pyrite (i.e., fool’s gold) and agreed on a
contract price of US$1 million. An independent expert appointed by both parties
valued the site at US$2.5 million but mistakenly surveyed Lake Apa (i.e., the
203

This hypothetical is a slight variation on classic gain/loss framing. Selling a valuable videogame for
US$1 is the equivalent of a foregone gain where the seller obtained some value but nevertheless did not obtain
the value both parties believed to exist. By contrast, buying a videogame for US$1 that both parties believed was
worth US$38,000 is a loss. Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 201.
204 As the hypothetical invoked the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, it is possible that rescission would
not be granted. The judges were told: “Utah courts have adopted the rule regarding mutual mistake stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that a contract is voidable when ‘a mistake of both parties
at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect
on the agreed exchange of promises.’” The judges were not instructed on other Restatement provisions, including
the full text of § 152 or § 154. Those provisions—involving risk allocation, which party bears the risk of a
mistake, and when a contract is voidable—create a possibility that rescission is improper. It is possible judges
used their pre-existing knowledge of the full scope of contract doctrine to adjudicate the doctrinal question
elements of rescission.
205 In this loss condition, fourteen of the seventeen judges rescinded the contract; only three judges failed
to rescind. Id.
206 In the foregone gain condition, thirteen of the thirty-two judges rescinded; nineteen judges failed to
rescind the contract. Id.
207 As contract disputes heard by judges and international arbitrators likely vary, it was necessary to adjust
the hypothetical to keep materials as realistic as possible within experimental constraints. Parties’ natures can
vary, contract subject matter varies, amounts in dispute are larger, and practices regarding expert valuation can
vary. Given the transnational context, we did not rely on U.S. legal materials when instructing arbitrators on the
applicable law.
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wrong site); but in reality, LaKapa contained gold deposits and was worth
US$500 million. In a second version, the concession still involved “LaKapa,”
but this time, both parties believed the site contained gold and agreed on a
contract price of US$380 million. A jointly appointed independent expert valued
the site at US$500 million but again mistakenly surveyed the wrong location; in
reality, LaKapa contained significant iron pyrite deposits and was only worth
US$2.5 million. The arbitrators were also instructed that under the applicable
law, parallel to the instruction in the videogame hypothetical, “a contract is
voidable when ‘a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a
basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the
agreed exchange of promises.’”208 Like the judges’ hypothetical, the contract
dispute provided two frames, and in both conditions, parties made mutual
mistakes about the contract.
Regardless of condition, 89.9% of international arbitrators rescinded the
contract.209 We nevertheless found some evidence of a small framing effect.
Where a buyer sought rescission, a slightly smaller proportion of arbitrators
(6.6%) disregarded the applicable law to enforce the contract. In contrast, where
a seller sought rescission, a slightly larger proportion of arbitrators (14%)
enforced the contract, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Contract Rescission and Framing: Percentage Rescinding
(n = responses)
Intended Purchase of Gold Mine:
Buyer/Investor Seeks Rescission
Intended Purchase of Fool’s Gold:
Seller/State Seeks Rescission
Total

Rescind Contract
93.4% (127)

Enforce Contract
6.6% (9)

86% (104)

14% (17)

89.9% (231)

10.1% (26)

Overall, the data demonstrate that framing appeared to influence
international arbitrators.210 As compared to their judicial counterparts answering
208 As international arbitrators come from different legal traditions, our experiment omitted any reference
to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and provided a clean statement of the governing law.
209 Two hundred thirty-one arbitrators rescinded the contract and twenty-six enforced. Five arbitrators did
not respond.
210 A Fisher’s exact test revealed that framing was marginally significant (p = 0.06; n = 257). The technical
non-significance could be due to insufficient power. Ex post power analysis reveals that power of the analysis
was 60%. A priori power analysis reveals a sample of 343—nearly 100 more arbitrators—would be required to
reliably ascertain the lack of a framing effect. Although the Fisher’s test is arguably preferable, a Pearson’s ChiSquare Test of Independence revealed that arbitrators were reliably affected by whether the claimant was a buyer
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a different question, arbitrators did not appear more susceptible to framing than
the Utah judges. Framing could, however, operate both similarly and differently
when comparing arbitrators and judges. One can imagine that it is possible that
other types of judges, who answered the precise hypothetical we administered
to arbitrators—rather than the hypothetical involving consumers, without an
independent expert report, and with an express reference to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts211—could perform differently than the Utah judges and
more similarly to the international arbitrators. The more critical insight, based
upon our framing experiments, is that we were unable to identify evidence that
the cognition of international arbitrators was inferior to their judicial
counterparts.
As a final matter, although it is not a traditional cognitive illusion but is of
interest to international arbitration, we tested whether rescission decisions varied
based on whether the arbitrator was appointed by the claimant, respondent, or a
neutral arbitration institution. The tests were unable, however, to ascertain a
reliable link: (1) between appointment process and rescission decisions,212 or (2)
the larger model that tested interactions among framing and appointment
variables.213 Table 7 provides a breakdown of arbitrator responses purely as a
function of appointment.

or seller (χ2(1) = 3.889; p = 0.049; r = 0.16). Using Cohen’s convention, the effect size for the significant effect
was statistically small.
211 See supra note 205.
212 When focusing purely on the appointment variable, a Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence failed
to confirm our hypothesis that appointment affected decisions (χ2(2) = 0.181; p = 0.91; r = 0.03; n = 257). The
overall pattern was, irrespective of appointment condition roughly 90% of arbitrators correctly applied the
applicable law and rescinded the contract. Inferences about the lack of a reliable relationship are improper as ex
post power analysis reveals that, because of the small effect size, the power of the analysis was 30%–40%.
213 For the 2x3 design that analyzed both the frame and the appointment conditions, it was not possible to
identify an interaction where frame and appointment variations produced meaningfully different rescission
decisions (χ2(5) = 8.121; p = 0.15; r = 0.18; n = 257). For buyer/investor claims: (a) with buyer/investor
appointment, forty-two (89.4%) rescinded and five enforced; (b) with seller/state appointment, forty-two
(95.5%) rescinded and two enforced; and (c) for ICSID appointment, forty-three (95.6%) rescinded and two
enforced. For seller/state rescission: (a) with seller/state appointment, thirty-six (92.3%) rescinded and three
enforced; (b) with buyer/investor appointment, twenty-nine (80.6%) rescinded and seven enforced; (c) with
ICSID appointment, thirty-nine (84.8%) rescinded and seven enforced. For the 2x3 design, the power of the
analysis was between 0.60–0.70. Although standard social science protocols tolerate an error of 20%, the ex post
power analysis reflects a 30%–40% risk of error. Note 214, infra, offers an a priori power analysis of the sample
required to reliably identify the reliable lack of an effect.
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Table 7: Contract Rescission and Appointment: Percentage Rescinding
(n = responses)
Claimant Appointment
Respondent Appointment
Institutional Appointment
Total

Rescind Contract
90.7% (78)
88.8% (71)
90.1% (82)
89.9% (231)

Enforce Contract
9.3% (8)
11.2% (9)
9.9% (9)
10.1% (26)

We observe that, as these are null results (i.e., the tests were unable to
identify a statistically significant effect), particular caution is warranted in
drawing inferences. The null results cannot prove the lack of an effect, but they
are a piece of evidence to consider before drawing firm conclusions about the
intuitive predisposition of international arbitrators.214 We nevertheless offer the
raw data in the hopes of advancing the science of arbitrator decisionmaking.215
D. Representativeness
People often make evaluations based on surface similarities, rather than base
rates or statistical realities. One archetypal example of this phenomenon, which
psychologists call “representativeness,”216 can be illustrated by the classic case,

214 There are a variety of reasons to be cautious about drawing strong inferences from the results. For
instance, for a 2x3 design to have acceptable power, a sample of 1029 arbitrators would be required. This
necessitates testing replication would require over 700 additional arbitrators to make a reliable conclusion about
the lack of a statistical effect. Relatedly, there are concerns about eternal validity. For example, the two to three
years it may take to resolve a case, the potential financial self-interest in repeat appointment, and the implications
of interactions with co-arbitrators could mean our study was unrealistic on appointment-related matters; and
inferences drawn from a hypothetical on appointment in this experimental setting are limited.
215 We observe, for example, that appointment effects might be constrained by clear rules of law and
minimal arbitrator discretion. One preliminary study suggested that, in one limited situation, appointment could
influence outcomes; namely, where an arbitrator made a decision on costs, a winning party-appointed arbitrator
(possibly appointed by either an investor or a state) often made a 100% cost shift in favor of the winner. Sergio
Puig & Anton Strezhnev, Affiliation Bias in Arbitration: An Experimental Approach 24–25 (Ariz. Legal Studies,
Discussion Paper No. 16-31) (copy on file with author). Puig and Strezhnev’s research may, however, be
confounded by the failure to address that successful investors reliably have costs shifted in their favor but
successful states did not. The research nevertheless raises the possibility that, in areas of arbitral discretion, an
“appointment effect” might contribute to arbitral decisionmaking; but likewise, where there is clear law and
bounded discretion, there could be decreased risk. Future research should explore this in greater detail.
216 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430 (1972); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84, 84–85 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982).
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Byrne v. Boadle.217 Previous research has used that case to test cognitive
illusions in judicial decisionmaking:
The plaintiff was passing by a warehouse owned by the defendant
when he was struck by a barrel, resulting in severe injuries. At the time,
the barrel was in the final stages of being hoisted from the ground and
loaded into the warehouse. The defendant’s employees are not sure
how the barrel broke loose and fell, but they agree that either the barrel
was negligently secured or the rope was faulty. Government safety
inspectors conducted an investigation of the warehouse and
determined that in this warehouse: (1) when barrels are negligently
secured, there is a 90% chance that they will break loose; (2) when
barrels are safely secured, they break loose only 1% of the time; (3)
workers negligently secure barrels only 1 in 1,000 times.218

In the earlier scholarship, researchers then asked the generalist judges:
“Given these facts, how likely is it that the barrel that hit the plaintiff fell due to
the negligence of one of the workers?” Judges could then select one of four
options: (a) 0%–25%, (b) 26%–50%, (c) 51%–75%, or (d) 76%–100%.219 The
correct answer, which requires deductive analysis, reveals the correct probability
of negligence was 8.3%.220 A more intuitive response, however, would treat the
90% figure as the likelihood that negligence caused the accident, thereby
converting the 90% statistic (i.e., the likelihood of negligence) into something
else (i.e., the likelihood of negligence given the injury).221
The earlier research observed that judges used intuitive, representative
thinking rather than rational, deductive thought. They found that only 40.9% of
judges selected the correct response, while a comparable 40.3% selected the

217

(1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. Ch.).
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 808 (quoting Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. 299).
219 Id.; Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 22–23.
220 See Guthrie Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 809 (“Because the defendant is negligent .1% of
the time and is 90% likely to cause an injury under these circumstances, the probability that a victim would be
injured by the defendant’s negligence is .09% (and the probability that the defendant is negligent but causes no
injury is .01%). Because the defendant is not negligent 99.9% of the time and is 1% likely to cause an injury
under these circumstances, the probability that on any given occasion a victim would be injured even though the
defendant took reasonable care is 0.999% (and the probability that the defendant is not negligent and causes no
injury is 98.901%). As a result, the conditional probability that the defendant is negligent given that the plaintiff
is injured equals .090% divided by 1.089%, or 8.3%.”); see also Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra
note 77, at 23 n.125.
221 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 22–23; Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich,
supra note 10, at 808–10; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 933, 939 (2006).
218
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intuitive, but incorrect, response, professing the belief that the accident was more
than 75% likely to have resulted from negligence.222
We gave the arbitrators who participated in our study a nearly identical
question, involving a storage company that had contracted with an engineering
corporation to deliver and maintain storage equipment. After a product defect
caused damage, the storage company pursued arbitration to recover for breach
of contract warrantees and negligent equipment maintenance. The arbitrators
learned that government safety inspectors:
determined that in this warehouse: (a) when containers are negligently
secured, there is a 90% chance that they will break loose; (b) when
containers are safely secured, they break loose only 1% of the time; (c)
workers negligently secure containers only 1 in 1,000 times. Given
these facts, how likely is it that the container fell due to the negligence
of one of Storage’s workers?

We asked participants to select one of four probability ranges: “(a) 0–25%,
(b) 26–50%, (c) 51–75%, or (d) 76–100%.” Of responding arbitrators,223 60.6%
(n = 152) answered the question correctly, while only 17.9% (n = 45) of the
international arbitrators selected the erroneous, but intuitive, answer. A small
proportion of international arbitrators selected incorrect non-intuitive answers,
with 8.8% (n = 23) and 11.8% (n = 31) selecting options (b) and (c),
respectively.224 On a structurally similar problem, international arbitrators
outperformed domestic judges, as Figure 3 suggests.225

222 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 77, at 23–24; Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich,
supra note 10, at 809–10.
223 All participants received this hypothetical. Eleven arbitrators (4.2%) failed to respond.
224 Thirty-two arbitrators (12.4%) made manuscript comments to calculate probabilities.
225 A Fisher’s exact test compared the correct and incorrect assessments of international arbitrators and U.S.
federal magistrate judges. The test demonstrated arbitrators were reliably better at identifying the correct answer
(p = 0.0001; r = 0.19; n = 410). Whereas 152 arbitrators (60.6%) answered correctly and 99 answered
incorrectly, 65 judges (40.9%) answered correctly and 94 answered incorrectly. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich,
supra note 10, at 809–10; Figure 3.
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Percentage of Responses to Representativeness
Hypothetical by International Arbitrators and U.S. Judges
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Figure 3. Percentage of Responses to Representativeness Hypothetical by
International Arbitrators and U.S. Judges.
Arbitrators also facially outperformed other professionals responding to
similar questions. In a New England Journal of Medicine study, fewer than 20%
of doctors at Harvard teaching hospitals responding to a similar problem
answered correctly, while 45% provided intuitive and incorrect responses.226
Only 10% of Norwegian law students correctly answered a similar problem,
while 58% of students selected the intuitive response.227 In short, international
arbitrators, though influenced by representativeness, appeared to do somewhat
better than other professionals confronting similar problems.

226 See Ward Casscells, Arno Schoenberger & Thomas B. Graboys, Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical
Laboratory Results, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999, 1000 (1978) (stating “[e]leven of the 60 participants, or 18 per
cent, gave the correct answer” and noting twenty-seven subjects (45%) selected the intuitive, incorrect response).
227 Erling Eide, Two Tests of Base Rate Neglect Among Law Students (2011), http://www.uio.no/studier/
emner/jus/jus/JUS4121/v12/undervisningsmateriale/Evidence RLE2 kopi 4 avd.pdf. The sampled Norwegian
law students may differ from law students elsewhere. When beta-testing the entire first-year class at Washington
& Lee Law School in January 2014 using the same question administered to arbitrators, 54% (n = 54) selected
the correct answer and 11% (n = 11) selected the intuitive incorrect answer.
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E. Egocentrism
People routinely overestimate their talents and life prospects. In one classic
study, for example, researchers found that recently married U.S. couples almost
unanimously expected they would not divorce, even though they knew the
divorce rate was 50%.228 Psychologists call this phenomenon the egocentric or
self-serving bias.
Egocentric bias can negatively impact adjudicators and the parties who
appear in front of them because it can “prevent judges from maintaining an
awareness of their limitations . . . [and] may make it hard for judges to recognize
that they can and do make mistakes.”229
Researchers have explored whether egocentrism affects judges. Eisenberg
originally identified a self-serving bias in bankruptcy judges. Specifically,
judges evaluated themselves as more fair, more efficient, and better case
managers than lawyers evaluated the same judges.230 Guthrie, Rachlinski, and
Wistrich similarly explored whether generalist231 and specialist232 judges
exhibited egocentrism. They found U.S. adjudicators likewise had self-serving
views of their adjudicative skills.
To explore whether and how egocentrism affects arbitrators, we randomly
gave subjects two questions asking them to assess themselves on several
arbitrator tasks—i.e., assessing witness credibility, making quality decisions,
providing parties with procedural efficiency, and the rate of challenges to their
awards. We asked the arbitrators to place themselves in one of four quartiles: (1)

228 Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993); cf. Ola Svenson, Are
We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (finding
88% of U.S. drivers and 77% of Swedish drivers believed themselves to be safer driver’s than the median, but
observing more U.S. drivers (46.3%) placed themselves in the most skilled group as compared to Swedes
(15.5%)).
229 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 815.
230 Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
979, 982 (1994). While 96% of judges reported ruling on requests for interim awards within thirty days, only
79% of lawyers reported that judicial conduct. Id. at 984. Compared to lawyers’ assessments, bankruptcy judges
perceived themselves as more closely monitoring cases and providing efficient fee reimbursement. Id. at 984–
87. See generally Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010).
231 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10.
232 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich., Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1519–20.
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the top 25%, (2) the second quartile, (3) the third quartile, or (4) the bottom
25%.233
As shown in Table 8, we found that international arbitrators, like U.S.
adjudicators, provided egocentric or self-serving interpretations of their
adjudicative skills. The distribution of arbitrators’ responses departs
significantly from what one would expect if there was no egocentrism bias.234
Table 8: Self-assessment of Adjudicative Skill: International Arbitrators,
Judges, and ALJs.235

In response to the query, “If the researchers were to rank all of the arbitrators
currently in this room according to their skill at reliably assessing witness

233 The instruction was to evaluate, based upon those in the room, whether arbitrators fell in the highest,
second highest, second lowest, or lowest quartile for a specific skill. See infra note 239.
234 In the absence of egocentrism, results should have been evenly distributed across quartiles. Instead, there
was a large and meaningful departure for responses to questions on witness credibility (t(123) = 27.983;
p < 0.001; r = 0.93; n = 124), efficiency in dispute resolution (t(123) = 30.549; p < 0.001, r = 0.94; n = 124),
impartial decisionmaking (t(123) = 25.554; p < 0.001, r = 0.92; n = 124), and challenges to awards
(t(121) = 22.534; p < 0.001, r = 0.90; n = 122). See COHEN, supra note 135, 113–16 (noting Cohen’s
conventions that a “large” effect is present when r ≥ 0.50).
235 Data from Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1519–20.
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credibility, what would your rate be?”, 76.6% of arbitrators236 identified that
they were better than the median arbitrator in the room.
Arbitrators were even more bullish in assessing their capacity to provide
unbiased decisions. When asked: “If the researchers were to rank all of the
arbitrators currently in this room according to their skill at making accurate and
impartial decisions, what would your rate be?”, nearly 85% of responding
arbitrators237 indicated they were better than the median arbitrator present at an
elite conference.
Arbitrators were most self-serving when assessing their procedural
efficiency. When asked, “If the researchers were to rank all of the arbitrators
currently in this room according to their skill at efficiently resolving disputes in
a timely manner, what would your rate be?”, nearly 92% of arbitrators238 ranked
themselves as superior to the median arbitrator in attendance.
In addition to evaluating themselves more favorably than their counterparts,
international arbitrators also assumed their decisions had been challenged much
less frequently than the decisions of their peers. We asked: “If the researchers
were to rank all of the arbitrators currently in this room according to the rate at
which their decisions have been challenged during their careers, what would
your rate be?”239 For the international arbitrators, 86.1% assumed that their
reversal rates were better (i.e., lower rates of challenge) than the median
arbitrator in the room.
Direct comparisons between judges and arbitrators remain difficult. On
balance, we found arbitrators and judges were similarly influenced by

236

answer.

One hundred thirty-one arbitrators received the credibility question. Seven arbitrators (5.3%) failed to

237 One hundred twenty-nine arbitrators received the decision-making question. Five arbitrators (3.9%) did
not answer.
238 One hundred thirty-three arbitrators received the efficiency question, but nine (6.7%) failed to answer.
239 This information can be found in the stimulus materials, which are available upon request from the lead
author.

FRANCK ET AL. GALLEYPROOFS3

1166

6/7/2017 9:45 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1115

egocentrism,240 though international arbitrators seemed somewhat less likely
than ALJs to overestimate the quality and integrity of their decisions.241
IV. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this first-ever psychological experiment involving international
arbitration, we found that arbitrators often made intuitive and impressionistic
decisions rather than the fully rational and deliberative decisions that might be
normatively desirable. This finding, though perhaps disappointing, is
unsurprising. Arbitrators are people, and they make judgments and decisions the
way other people do.
More encouraging, and perhaps more surprising, we found evidence
contradicting common tropes against arbitration. Although direct comparisons
are difficult, our data revealed that international arbitrators performed at least as
well as, but never demonstrably worse than, judges. There may be reasons to
prefer judges to arbitrators,242 but quality of judgment and decisionmaking, at
240 A Fisher’s Exact Test was unable to identify a meaningful difference in the responses of international
arbitrators and ALJs self-assessments of capacity to evaluate witness credibility. Using ALJ responses from
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 77, at 1520, it was not possible to detect different
response patterns for ALJs ranking themselves above (n = 30) or below the median (n = 6) and arbitrators who
ranked themselves above (n = 95) and below (n = 29) the median (p = 0.495; r = 0.07; n = 160). Similarly, a
Fisher’s exact test was unable to detect a meaningful difference in how magistrate judges and international
arbitrators self-assessed whether their decisions would be successfully challenged in later court action (p = 0.72;
r = 0.02; n = 277). Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 809–10, found 136 judges ranked
themselves above the median in reversal rates (i.e., having low reversal rates), whereas nineteen judges ranked
themselves as being below the median. One hundred five arbitrators ranked themselves as being superior to the
median (i.e., having lower challenge rates) and seventeen arbitrators evaluated themselves as being in the two
lowest quartiles (i.e., having a higher challenge rate). The results lacked sufficient power to definitively exclude
presence of a relationship; but as the effect size was less than small, null-results may not reflect low power.
241 A Fisher’s exact test analyzed ALJs ranking themselves above (n = 35) and below (n = 1) the median
for unbiased decisions, and international arbitrators ranking themselves above (n = 105) and below (n = 19) the
median for impartial decisions. A greater proportion of ALJs over-estimated their skill in making unbiased
decisions as compared to arbitrators (p = 0.048, r = 0.16). This does not mean arbitrators were immune from
egocentrism in evaluating their capacity to make impartial decisions, as data reflects they fell prey to the same
fallacy. Rather, a lower proportion of international arbitrators self-identified high skills and greater proportion
were somewhat more modest. Slight variations in wording limit the value of comparison, however.
242 There may be legitimate concerns about arbitration, including concerns of public access and
transparency. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075–76, 1078 (1984). UNCITRAL’s
new treaty and arbitration rules provide increased transparency, particularly in ITA. G.A. Res. 69/116, United
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf;
G.A. Res. 68/109, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Dec. 16,
2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.
pdf. Concerns about arbitrators’ incentives for ethical conduct can and should be addressed. Existing duties of
impartiality and laws permit challenge and dismissal of biased arbitrators. See supra notes 70 and accompanying
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least as measured in these experimental studies, is not one of them. In addition,
our work casts doubt on the common assumption that arbitrators simply “split
the baby” when making decisions. Rather, confirming existing research on real
awards,243 international arbitrators did not appear to “split the baby” when
making awards.244
The experimental results explicate the possible ongoing normative value of
arbitration. Having failed to identify international arbitrators’ inferior capacity,
the possibility remains that structural safeguards might improve arbitration and
to decrease risk of error. We acknowledge the limitations of the results yet wish
to make normative recommendations that system designers may consider for
managing disputes.
A. Limitations
The fact that we find evidence of intuitive decisionmaking in our
experimental research does not conclusively demonstrate that arbitrators behave
similarly during actual proceedings.
First, as we have noted in this Article and elsewhere,245 selection effects limit
the value of inferences. Because we do not know, and likely will never be able
to know, the demographic characteristics of the global population of
international arbitrators, we cannot definitively confirm how representative our
sample might be. It is possible that the international arbitrators who attended
ICCA and participated in our study skewed older, more economically
advantaged, more elite, and with a greater proportion of women.246

text. The recently signed Trans-Pacific Partnership includes a “code of conduct” for international arbitrators.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
(2015),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-transpacific-partnership. A full discussion of net normative costs and benefits of international arbitration is beyond
this Article, which focuses on experimental manipulation in search of evidence-based insights for targeted
reform and informed decisionmaking. See supra notes 4, 58 (describing concerns about international arbitration
addressed by other literature).
243 Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
244 In contradiction to claims that arbitrators are intuitively predisposed to parties appointing them, our
experiment was unable to identify evidence that party appointment reliably influenced contract rescission. See
supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. These null results also come with limitations. See supra note 215.
245 See, e.g., supra notes 133–34, 165, 244–46 (identifying some of the issue-specific limitations); see also
Franck et al., supra note 4, at 443–46, 501.
246 Franck et al., supra note 4, at 443–45. Recent research suggests female arbitrators remain less than 10%
of the population of international arbitrators. Lucy Greenwood & C. Mark Baker, Is the Balance Getting Better?
An Update on the Issue of Gender Diversity in International Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L 413, 415 (2015). By
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Second, international arbitrators’ conduct in real disputes could differ from
responses to our hypotheticals. International arbitration proceedings are often
lengthy, complex, and rely upon numerous witness statements and voluminous
documents. Rather than making snap judgments during a survey, arbitrators
have access to time, resources, tribunal secretaries who function like judicial
clerks, and group deliberations.247 Applicable substantive and procedural law
could inject debiasing mechanisms that limit the influence of cognitive illusions.
The differences between our experiment and the natural ecology of international
arbitration therefore necessitate caution in making strong inferences.
Nevertheless, the results likely have some application beyond the laboratory.
The research employed standard cognitive psychology research methods used
successfully on other adjudicators for over a decade, and similar methodologies
have proven successful in identifying strategies people use to make decisions in
real life.248 Moreover, decisionmakers may be even more likely to rely on
cognitive shortcuts, like anchoring and framing, in real-world settings precisely
because of the volume of information and complexity of decisionmaking.
Third, the inherent heterogeneity of international economic disputes may
limit the external validity of our research. Our materials explored
decisionmaking within ICA and ITA disputes. It is possible the results are not
generalizable more broadly given variation in disputes, context, facts, applicable
law, or culture.
Fourth, several hypotheticals asked arbitrators to make independent
decisions, as if they were a sole arbitrator or one arbitrator on a three-member
tribunal.249 It is unusual for arbitrators to act alone; rather, three-member
tribunals are standard. Our research was unable to capture one of the
fundamental rule-of-law values and debiasing tools embedded within

contrast, our study identified roughly 17% of the arbitrators were female, which creates a risk women were
overrepresented in our research.
247 Group deliberation could, but need not, guarantee enhanced quality. Infra note 262.
248 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 10, at 819; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the
Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 582 (1996). Others dispute the influence of cognitive
psychology. Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases”, 2
EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83, 84–85, 109–10 (1991).
249 In the one hypothetical that manipulated party appointment—and placed subjects in the role of acting as
a claimant, respondent, or institutional appointee—we were unable to identify that appointment reliably affected
arbitrators’ legal decisions. See supra note 213. There is a difference, however, between answering a
hypothetical question during a thirty to forty minute survey and living through a case for two to three years as a
party-appointee. While we may have captured some aspects of arbitrator intuition, this does not address the
sustained influence of environmental factors occurring over an arbitration’s lifetime.
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international arbitration—namely, the deliberation process. Future research
should explore panel effects in decisionmaking.
Fifth, the results may be sui generis to international arbitration. International
dispute settlement is highly specialized, involving different practices, different
legal rules, and high barriers to entry.250 It is possible that inferences for
domestic arbitration are limited, as international arbitrators do not necessarily
adjudicate domestic consumer and employment disputes. Likewise, although
there is a degree of overlap between international arbitrators and judges on
international courts and tribunals,251 that overlap is not complete. Caution is
therefore warranted about the scope of inferences.
Sixth, we acknowledge that linguistic capacity could influence responses.
Yet, English is a lingua franca252 and has become dominant in international
arbitration.253 It is possible that a conference in English did not generate a large
selection effect, as those without English skills may not be actively engaged in
international arbitration. Yet the risk is not eliminated, and non-native English
speakers could systemically differ. Native language, however, did not explain
the performance of international arbitrators. For those items where arbitrators
performed particularly well, we were unable to identify meaningful differences
in the responses of native and non-native English speakers.254

250

DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 81, at 10, 124, 198; Rogers, Vocation, supra note 3, at 963–64.
Past and present judges on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have been arbitrators. Multiple ICJ
members have been ITA arbitrators in disputes or ad hoc committees, including: James Crawford, Chris
Greenwood, Peter Tomka, Joan Donoghue, Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, and Patrick Robinson. Two former ICJ
judges (Bruno Simma and Stephen Schwebel) were also arbitrators. Charles Brower and David Caron were or
are serving as a judge on the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; and both have been international arbitrators. Giorgio
Sacerdoti, Georges Abi-Saab, Florentino Feliciano, and Donald McRae have been arbitrators and WTO
adjudicators. See José Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators, 1 ONATI
SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, 2011, at 1, 14; Joost Pauwelyn, Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment
Arbitrators Are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 768–69 (2015).
252 Timothy Lau, Offensive Use of Prior Art to Invalidate Patents in U.S. and Chinese Patent Litigation, 30
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 201, 250 (2013).
253 Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
69, 86 (2003); Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International
Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 887 (2001).
254 Bivariate correlations could not identify reliable links between native English speakers or non-native
speakers for: CRT scores (r(232) = 0.08; p = 0.24) or correct responses on representativeness (r(243) = -0.03;
p = 0.61). Native English capacity was not reliably associated with responses on the beach front property
(r(95) = 0.08; p = 0.43) or contract rescission (r(249) = -0.05; p = 0.41) hypotheticals. As all analyses were less
than statistically small (r < 0.10), the analysis may not be underpowered. A sample of 781 arbitrators would be
sufficiently powered to reliably exclude the possibility of a native-language effect.
251
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Lastly, in those instances when tests were unable to detect differences, it is
not possible to rule differences out. Although many latent effects were
statistically small, various tests were statistically underpowered. Post hoc power
analyses revealed samples of 780–1000 arbitrators would be required to
ascertain the lack of an effect.255 More research is therefore necessary. We
acknowledge the limitations and hope this first-generation research provides a
baseline for future scholarship.
B. Normative Implications
In this study, we sought to explore whether international arbitrators, like
other adjudicators, make decisions in ways that depart from the rational actor
model in transnational adjudication. We found that they do, and this, in turn, has
implications for the design of transnational dispute settlement systems (as well
as domestic dispute systems).
1. Allocating Adjudicative Authority
Our research demonstrates that, like other expert adjudicators, international
arbitrators were susceptible to cognitive illusions including anchoring, framing
effects, representativeness, and egocentrism. While comparisons between
arbitrators and judges are difficult, we found no evidence that arbitrators were
inferior to judges.
When choosing to allocate adjudicative authority to judges or arbitrators,
then, designers of dispute settlement systems should not presume that national
(or international) judges will inevitably provide decisionmaking services that are
superior to international arbitrators. Earlier research demonstrates that national
judges over-rely on intuition and make errors in legal decisionmaking. So do
arbitrators. Regardless of title or mandate, adjudicators are fallible beings who
generate error, even with the best of intentions and effort. When making
normative design choices about who should resolve international disputes,
arbitrators should neither be favored nor disfavored based on their cognitive
skill.
While there are undoubtedly costs to using arbitration—including paying for
the services of the arbitrators and related institutions—there are likewise
benefits. International arbitration might offer opportunities to minimize the risk
255

size).

See, e.g., supra notes 133, 164, 210, 212–14 (offering power analyses and identifying requisite sample
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of some adjudicative error. For example, international arbitrators are a
transnational group speaking multiple languages. Research suggests that people
are less likely to fall prey to cognitive illusions when evaluating options in a
language other than their mother tongue.256 This generates the possibility that
international arbitrators’ standard practice, involving regular interaction with
different languages or cultures, increases the likelihood of careful attention and
focused deliberation. Beyond this, the elite nature of international arbitration—
and strong barriers to entry—likely generate market forces where highly
qualified lawyers and transnational professionals ultimately serve as
arbitrators.257
2. Minimizing Risk of Error Through Structure and Procedure
If intuition influences all adjudicators, critics are correct that judicial systems
require procedural safeguards to minimize inaccurate or sub-optimal
decisionmaking. There is obviously a potential trade-off between accuracy on
the one hand and speed on the other. Adding procedures or implementing other
debiasing mechanisms could decrease the risk of error but increase the time and
cost of a dispute settlement process. Thus, dispute system designers, as well as
parties selecting among dispute resolution mechanisms, should carefully weigh
the benefits and costs of procedures designed to enhance decision accuracy.258
International arbitration typically includes some structures that might have
debiasing effects and could easily incorporate others.259
For example, parties in international arbitration typically choose to have
disputes resolved by three-member tribunals. The presence of multiple
256 See Micheline Favreau & Norman S. Segalowitz, Automatic and Controlled Processes in the First- and
Second-Language Reading of Fluent Bilinguals, 11 MEMORY & COGNITION 565, 567 (1983) (theorizing foreign
language evaluations require more deliberate processing and fewer intuitive assessments); Boaz Keysar, Sayuri
L. Hayakawa & Sun Gyu An, The Foreign-Language Effect: Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision
Biases, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 661, 661, 667 (2012) (observing framing effects and loss aversion disappeared or
decreased when subjects were tested in a foreign language).
257 It is difficult to make uniform observations about the over 190 national judiciaries. Some judges are
elected or partisan. Others may be elite professionals, but lack linguistic and inter-cultural competencies. There
may also be partisanship concerns deriving from national or regional sympathies. International judges may share
characteristics of international arbitrators, including language skills, training in multiple legal systems, and intercultural competencies.
258 Elm, supra note 83, 114–24 (proposing several amendments to the UNCITRAL Rules to debias
arbitrators).
259 Both international arbitration and litigation permit evidence testing. In arbitration, parties challenge
material facts and applicable law, providing an opportunity to disrupt and assess claims rather than relying on
intuition or supposition. Court litigation can be similar.
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adjudicators, who must interact and deliberate together, permits coordinated
decisionmaking and group deliberation. While group deliberation is not
necessarily an unmitigated good—indeed, it can lead to polarization and
exacerbate decision errors—it can facilitate collaborative deliberation that
serves as a check upon intuitive assessments.260
Moreover, many, if not most, international arbitration panels produce written
opinions. In ITA, for example, 100-plus page opinions are common. The process
of opinion writing itself could also serve as a check on intuition and facilitate
deliberation, leading to higher quality outcomes. In those instances where
arbitrators are not required by governing rules to write opinions, parties could
contract for opinions, if so inclined. Parties also might mandate that tribunals
include subsections in awards, follow prescribed checklists, or provide
substantive reasoning of critical, replicable issues, if the parties believe they
would benefit from a more detailed and precise explication of decisionmaking.
This speaks to a general virtue of international arbitration. In arbitration, in
contrast to litigation, parties can adopt procedural rules and structures to enhance
adjudicative quality and minimize the risk of decision error. For example, parties
can structure procedures to give arbitrators more time to devote to deliberation.
Likewise, parties can draft arbitration agreements to inject additional procedural
rigor to decrease risks of error from intuitive adjudication.
Consider, for example, anchors. Our results show that irrelevant anchors,
particularly large anchors, influenced the damage assessments of international
arbitrators. Parties to arbitrations might craft rules to require a good-faith
pleading rule or to provide clear cost-shifting rules to incentivize accurate
damage assessments at the start of the case.261 Alternatively, rules might require
parties to produce supported damage assessments at the outset so that, when
pleading damages, parties do so with particularity and support. Other
260 Group deliberations do not necessarily enhance quality or accuracy. DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION
MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 152–53, 158–59 (2012); Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis
of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 149 (1997); Dan Simon, More Problems with
Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2012, No. 2, at
167, 193–200; Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 26–35
(2009).
261 The ICSID Convention does not have clear cost-shifting rules, and tribunals have not offered consistent
rulings on costs or a clear set of incentives for cost assessments. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 11, at 801 & n.170
(noting that “there is no international convention on the treatment of costs in investment treaty arbitration”);
David Smith, Shifting Sands: Cost-and-Fee Allocation in International Investment Arbitration, 51 VA. J. INT’L
L. 749, 751–52 (2011) (noting that tribunals have rendered “scattershot” rulings on costs under the ICSID
Convention).
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stakeholders may wish to take this approach. For example, international
arbitration institutions revising rules, national legislatures amending law, or
states negotiating treaties may wish to explore providing clear default rules for
international arbitration that: (a) require parties to plead damages with
specificity and in good faith or (b) create incentives for reasonable, evidencebased damage claims. Such an approach could maximize the value of relevant
anchors and decrease the risk that irrelevant anchors exert improper influence
on damage assessments.
With each of these procedural innovations, there is tension between
efficiency and accuracy. The tension may be more theoretical than real. One
could imagine a complex international dispute, being decided by three subject
matter experts, with adequate time and prepared parties, creating a written
opinion that would minimize the chance for error and produce a just and timely
result.262 As long as parties and arbitrators acknowledge that humans must test
intuition with deliberation, arbitration’s flexibility allows parties and arbitrators
to create a tailor-made process to do so.
CONCLUSION
Arbitrators, like judges, are fallible. Arbitrators, like judges, make intuitive
decisions that they might, or might not, override with deliberation. Arbitrators,
like judges, are influenced by anchoring, framing, representativeness, and
egocentric bias. In short, arbitrators are like judges, and arbitral decisionmaking
is like judicial decisionmaking. Whether appointed by the state and appearing in
robes, or selected by parties and appearing in business suits, adjudicators are
human beings, and human beings make predictable judgment and
decisionmaking errors.
The insight that adjudicators, whether judges or arbitrators, will commit
decision errors should inform those designing dispute systems, whether
domestically or internationally. Those designing dispute resolution systems
should focus less on who decides and more on structural features and procedural
safeguards that increase the likelihood that the decisionmaker, whomever or
whatever she is, provides justice.

262 This observation may have limits, as experimental research suggests offering increased time does not
enhance adjudication quality. Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the
Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 931, 939 (2012).

